The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
119.
The assessment
of ISF capability from other sources was still
discouraging:
•
Operation
CORRODE, an operation aimed at removing corrupt police,
proved
difficult
to implement with limited political engagement in Basra. The
JIC
afterwards
reported that it suspected that officers had been reassigned
rather
than
removed.
•
The JIC
reported that the ISF could cope with low‑level threats but its
readiness
to handle
Shia extremists or intra‑Shia violence was uncertain. Army
command,
control and
logistics capabilities were all still developing, making
major
operations
without MNF support difficult.
•
Mr Robin
Lamb, British Consul General in Basra, reported that local
staff
regarded
the IPS “as at best ineffective, and at worst complicit in
the
assassinations.
We would support that assessment”.
120.
The security
situation in MND(SE) continued to decline in 2006, and the
UK
continued
to plan for drawdown. That is addressed in Section
9.8.
121.
The MOD’s
assessment in June was that the ISF programme was “on target
to
complete by
December 2006 with 80 percent of the ISF trained and equipped
(less
the forces
in Anbar province and the Air Force and Navy
capability)”.66
The police
were
“some way
behind” but “significant progress” was expected by the end of the
year. Their
effectiveness
rested on their credibility with the Iraqi people, which was
“increasing but
remain[ed]
an issue”. The ISF should “be capable of managing the threat that
they will
face but
could be quickly undermined by poor leadership”.
122.
On 1
September, an eGram from the British Embassy Baghdad reported
an
“important
step psychologically”67
for the
Iraqi military: the Iraqi Ground Forces
Command and
Iraqi Ministry of Defence would commence “a staggered handover”
of
command and
control functions from MNF‑I on 3 September. The Embassy stated
that
“while the
assumption of responsibility looks gradual and sensibly phased, in
reality the
pace will
be demanding to both MNF‑I and the IGFC [Iraqi Ground Forces
Command]”.
As “life
support and logistics capabilities” were “developing at their own,
much slower,
pace”,
the Embassy predicted that “IA Divisions will remain dependent
on MNF‑I for
some
time to come”.
123.
In summer
2006, in recognition of the need to stabilise Basra and prepare
it
for
transition to Iraqi control, the UK developed the Basra Security
Plan and Better
Basra Plan.
The former was “a plan to improve Basra through operations, high
impact
66
Minute
DJC/Iraq to CO [junior official], 7 June 2006, ‘Iraq: Strategy
Group Workstrands’ attaching Paper
‘Update on
Progress of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)’.
67
eGram
38264/06 Baghdad to FCO, 1 September 2006, ‘Iraq: Iraqis to Take
Over Command and Control
of its
First Army Division’.
436