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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
124.  Sir David advised Mr Blair to register “extreme caution” and to address a number
of questions; in particular how this was suddenly possible, the Turkish angle, and
whether the UK could sustain the numbers and, if so, for how long.
125.  Mr Blair commented: “As discussed. Be careful of this Land idea …”37
126.  In a meeting with Mr Hoon on 23 September, Mr Blair agreed limited
contingency preparations for a land option, but asked for publicity to be
minimised.
127.  Following the discussion, the MOD informed the US that the UK was still
considering a land option.
128.  That was not the No.10 understanding of what had been agreed.
129.  In the context of the many issues which were being addressed on
23 September 2002,38 the Inquiry has seen no evidence to indicate that the
difference of view about what Mr Blair and Mr Hoon had agreed was anything
other than a genuine misunderstanding.
130.  Mr Blair discussed the issues with Mr Hoon on 23 September.
131.  Following that meeting, Mr Watkins informed officials in the MOD that:
“The Prime Minister is content for us to proceed broadly as set out in my letter
of 20 September. The Prime Minister remains very cautious about the viability
of Package 3, not least because of its implications for our ability to meet other
contingencies and the significant cost premium entailed. In the light of this, Mr Hoon
believes that it is all the more necessary heavily to caveat this possibility in contacts
with the US. We should emphasise that it is at the limits of what we could offer and
that – because of other potential demands on our Armed Forces including FRESCO
– we cannot be sure that we could deliver it. The US must therefore examine
carefully how they would plan the campaign in the absence of such a contribution.”39
132.  The packages that might be offered to the US were to be conveyed in terms
cleared with Mr Hoon’s Private Office.
37 Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 22 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Possible
UK Military Contribution’.
38 Preparations for publication of the WMD dossier and statement/debates in Parliament on
24 September 2002.
39 Minute Watkins to DG Op Pol, 23 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the Prime Minister:
23 September’.
220
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