The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The Summary
of Iraq’s capabilities had been revised to focus first on
Iraq’s
ballistic
missiles, including the addition of a statement that Iraq retained
“some
prohibited
missile systems”.
•
A statement
that Al Qaida would “continue with its efforts to acquire WMD
and
will use
them if successful” was added to the Summary.
325.
In the
detailed section on Iraq, the key changes were:
•
References
to relevant UN resolutions and statements that Iraq was in breach
of
those
resolutions and the NPT were added and emphasised throughout the
text.
•
Addition of
text stating that the sanctions regime had “impeded” Iraq’s
efforts
to
reconstitute its capabilities, but had “not halted them. Much of
Iraq’s missile
infrastructure
has been rebuilt; the nuclear weapons programme is been
[sic]
reconstituted;
and Iraq continues to have the capability to produce chemical
and
biological
weapons, and may already have done so.”
•
The section
on ballistic missiles was strengthened by the addition of
further
details,
including:
{{Iraq had
chemical and biological warheads available in 1991, but did
not
use
them.
{{Recent
evidence suggested that Iraq had succeeded in
“reverse”
engineering
SCUD missile engines, which meant it could build new
missiles.
{{Some Al
Hussein missiles “could be available for use”, and although
they
were “not
very accurate” they were “still an effective system which could
be
used with a
conventional, chemical or biological warhead”.
{{Reporting had
recently confirmed that Iraq’s priority was “to
develop
longer-range
missile systems, which we judge are likely to have
ranges
over
1,000km”.
{{Removal
of the reference to Iraq working on missile systems “with
ranges
up to
2,000km”.
•
The nuclear
section was strengthened by the addition of text on:
{{Iraq’s
aim before the Gulf Conflict to produce a weapon with a 20
kiloton
yield,
“ultimately” for delivery in a ballistic missile
warhead.
{{Details
of the impact of such a weapon if it was used over
London.
{{Intelligence
in the last year which “indicated” that specialists were
recalled
to work on
the nuclear programme “in the autumn of 1998”.
{{Iraq
exploration of the use of radiological dispersal devices before
the
Gulf
Conflict, but there was “no evidence that they have
maintained
this interest”.
•
Detailed
drafting changes to the text on chemical and biological
weapons,
including
that Iraq’s modification of the L-29 trainer was judged to be
“designed
for the
delivery of chemical and biological agents”.
74