4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
248.
A number of
key points were made in the JIC discussion:
•
“Once
finalised it [the Assessment] would be of immense interest to
Ministers
and
officials, and would help to underline the importance and
seriousness of the
threat Iraq
posed with these weapons. The fact that Saddam Hussein
possessed
these
capabilities, and that he showed every sign of being prepared to
use them,
was
significant.”
•
“Another
important message, which needed to be brought out more
clearly
in the
draft, was that if the chips were down, and Saddam believed his
regime
to be under
real threat of extinction, nothing was going to deter him from
using
such
weapons. Readers of the paper needed to be reminded of
Saddam’s
unpredictability,
and of the fact that his thought processes did not
work
in a recognisably
Western rational and logical way.”
•
“The draft
should also distinguish more clearly between the three
different
ways in
which Iraq might use its offensive chemical or biological
capabilities: in
weaponised
form against military targets; in an unconventional attack on
military
targets; or
as part of a sponsored terrorist attack aimed at spreading fear
and
influencing
public attitudes”.
•
“[S]ince
the draft had been written and circulated, an important and
valuable
supply of
new intelligence had been received, from a variety of sources,
judged
by the
producers to be reliable and authoritative. The draft needed to …
include
this
intelligence with an expert assessment of its
significance.”
•
“It [the
Assessment] also needed to be clearer which of its judgements
were
based on
firm intelligence, which were based more on informed
assessment
or
interpretation, and where the major gaps in the UK’s knowledge
and
understanding
of Iraq’s capabilities remained.”
•
“It was
possible that further insights from intelligence would be
forthcoming
in the
relatively near future. These might not only inform any future
Assessments
but might
also need to be reflected somehow in the dossier on Iraq’s
weapons
of mass
destruction programmes that was being prepared for
publication.”
249.
Mr Scarlett
proposed that the paper should be revised to reflect the discussion
and
then
reviewed “at working level by the relevant experts”. Once that was
done, the paper
would be
issued in its final form.
250.
The Key
Judgements of the JIC Assessment of 9 September
stated:
“•
Iraq has a
chemical and biological weapons capability and Saddam is
prepared
to use
it.
•
Faced with
the likelihood of military defeat and being removed from
power,
Saddam is
unlikely to be deterred from using chemical and biological
weapons
by any
diplomatic or military means.
•
The use of
chemical and biological weapons prior to any military attack
would
boost
support for US-led action and is unlikely.
157