3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
452.
In the entry
in his memoir for 14 February, Mr Cook wrote:
“The news
from New York is electrifying. The latest report by Hans Blix
registers a
lot of
progress in co-operation from Iraq, fails to identify any evidence
of weapons
of mass
destruction and expresses confidence that with more time more
progress
can be
made. What Hans Blix was in effect confirming was that the UK
strategy of
applying
pressure on Saddam to co-operate on disarmament, through the dual
track
of
inspectors on the ground and the threat of force across his border,
is working
453.
Mr Cook
added his view that Mr Blair needed the
inspectors:
“… to prove
that Saddam will not co-operate and that he is therefore
justified
in going to
war … The ghastly dilemma he now faces is that without Hans
Blix
denouncing
Saddam, there is little chance of getting a majority in the
Security
Council for
military conflict, and therefore even less chance of getting a
majority of
the British
people.”
454.
In his speech
to the Labour Party conference in Glasgow on 15 February,
Mr Blair
stated that
the Labour Party would come through an uncertain time by holding
firm to its
beliefs and
the United Nations was one of those beliefs. He
wanted:
“… to solve
the issue of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction through the
UN.
That is why
last November we insisted on putting UN inspectors back into
Iraq
to disarm it.
“Dr Blix
reported to the UN yesterday and there will be more time given
to
inspections.
He will report again on 28 February. But let no one forget two
things.
To anyone
familiar with Saddam’s tactics of deception and evasion, there is a
weary
sense of
déjà vu. As ever, at the last minute concessions are made. And as
ever it
is the long
finger that is directing them. The concessions are suspect.
Unfortunately,
the weapons
are real.”119
455.
Mr Blair
continued that the inspections regime in resolution 1441 was
tough
because for
12 years Saddam Hussein had played a “game with the inspectors”
and:
“The time
needed is not the time it takes for the inspectors to discover the
weapons.
They are
not a detective agency. We played that game for years in the 1990s.
The
time is the
time necessary to make a judgement: is Saddam prepared to
co-operate
fully or
not. If he is, the inspectors can take as much time as they want.
If he is not,
if this
is a repeat of the 1990s – and I believe it is – then let us be in
no doubt what
is at
stake.
118
Cook
R. The Point
of Departure. Simon
& Schuster UK Ltd, 2003.
119
Scoop
World, 15
February 2003, Prime
Minister Tony Blair’s Glasgow Party Speech.
261