The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
resistance
and moderates looking for a peaceful solution. Recent events have
seen
the
emergence of the Mahdi Army as a minority violent Shia opposition.
Some will
probably
not accept any outcome of the current negotiations and will
continue to
attack the
Coalition.”532
959.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Rycroft with “initial advice” on
the four
US
proposals for additional UK deployments on 29
April.533
Efforts to
understand the
proposals
better had “thrown up conflicting evidence about the US thinking
behind
these proposals
and the relative priority they attach to each
element”.
960.
The letter
continued, “the Defence Secretary and the Chiefs of Staff do
not
believe
that it [the deployment of the ARRC] should be actively considered
for the time
being” but
that further consideration should be given to the feasibility of
expanding
MND(SE). To
keep options open, the planned withdrawal of Warrior vehicles was
being
halted and
a recce team was being deployed to Iraq to give detailed
consideration
to the
options.
961.
The letter
also reflected Mr Hoon’s view that:
“… any
significant increase in our military commitment in Iraq would need
to be
considered
in the context of the whole cross-Government effort … if we were
to
take on
Najaf and Qadisiyah we would need FCO and DFID to help ensure
that
acceptable
arrangements are in place on the CPA (and post-CPA) side
…”
962.
In a letter to
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary on 30 April, Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary
outlined
Mr Brahimi’s plans to return to Iraq swiftly to continue
consultations on forming
the Interim
Government.534
He remained
confident of completing the task by 31 May.
963.
A particular
issue was the future role of the GC since any arrangements for
them
to continue
to have a role would have to be formalised in an annex to the TAL,
to
which the
GC were co-signatories. The FCO suggested that one solution might
be to
guarantee
any GC members without positions in the Interim Government seats in
the
Consultative Assembly.
964.
The same
letter addressed the UN Security Council resolution being drafted
by the
US and UK.
The UN was believed to be:
“… keen to
use the Resolution to clarify their role, but also to downplay
expectations
that they
can, and will, take over from the CPA after 30 June. Their focus is
on
taking
forward the elections process … They are reluctant to resume
large-scale
humanitarian
operations until the security situation is clearer.”
532
JIC
Assessment, 28 April 2004, ‘Iraq Update’.
533
Letter
Baker to Rycroft, 29 April 2004, ‘Iraq: UK Response to US
Approaches’.
534
Letter Owen
to Quarrey, 30 April 2004, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi’s Visit to London, 3
May’.
364