3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
•
the
establishment of an ad hoc group of officials to consider
the
development
of an information campaign agreed with the US.
228.
The purpose
of the Cabinet Office paper was to identify the conditions
which
would be
necessary before military action would be justified and the UK
could
participate
in such action; and to provide the basis for a discussion with the
US
about
creating those conditions.
229.
The Cabinet
Office paper stated that Mr Blair had said at Crawford that
the
UK would
support military action to bring about regime change, provided
certain
conditions
were met.
230.
The Cabinet
Office paper ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’ was issued
on
19 July
to those who would attend the meeting chaired by Mr Blair on 23
July.107
231.
Ministers were
invited to note the latest position on US military planning,
the
timescales
for possible action, and to agree:
•
The
objective for any military action should be, as set out in Mr
Hoon’s minute
to Mr Blair
of 31 May, “a stable and law-abiding Iraq within the present
borders,
co-operating
with the international community, no longer posing a threat
to
its
neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its
international
obligations
on WMD”.
•
To “engage
the US on the need to set military plans within a realistic
political
strategy”,
which included “identifying the succession to Saddam Hussein
and
creating
the conditions necessary to justify government military action,
which
might
include an ultimatum for the return of UN weapons inspectors to
Iraq.
This should
include a call from the Prime Minister to President Bush
ahead
of the
briefing of US military plans to the President on 4
August.”
•
The
establishment of a Cabinet Office-led ad hoc group of officials to
consider
the
development of an information campaign to be agreed with the
US.
232.
The paper
stated that US military planning for action against Iraq was
“proceeding
apace” but
it lacked a political framework: “In particular, little thought has
been given to
creating
the political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and
how to shape it.”
233.
It seemed
“unlikely” that the UK’s objective could be achieved while
Saddam
Hussein’s
regime remained in power. The US objective was “unambiguously”
the
“removal of
Saddam Hussein’s regime, followed by elimination of Iraqi WMD”. The
view
of UK
officials was that it was by “no means certain” that one would
follow from the
other: even
if regime change was “a necessary condition for controlling Iraq’s
WMD”,
it was
“certainly not a sufficient one”.
107
Paper
Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military
Action’.
43