The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
produce
some surplus capability. Multilateral meetings were scheduled on 30
April and
8 May
to take things forward.
680.
Mr Watkins
advised that discussions with the US on the size of the UK AOR
were
continuing:
“The US
aspire for us to supervise an additional two provinces, probably
Dhi Qar
and
Muthanna (the latter now seems more likely than Wasit), although we
have
stressed
the need to ensure that our area is coterminous with an ORHA
region.
Each
additional province will need to be covered by a brigade
headquarters,
although
both provinces, in particular Muthanna, should be manageable with
much
less than a
full brigade’s worth of military capability.”
681.
Adm Boyce
advised the 24 April meeting of the AHMGIR that the
US planned to
divide Iraq
into five sectors.385
The UK
would lead one sector, comprising four provinces
in
south-eastern Iraq. That was “manageable … provided that other
countries offered
troops to
work with us”. The UK could take on a fifth province “if others
contributed the
necessary
forces for it”. The southern region of ORHA would follow the
boundaries of
the UK’s
sector.
682.
Ministers
agreed that “the size of the UK military sector will depend on
the
permissiveness
of the environment and the extent of other nations’ contributions,
but
the current
assumption was that it would comprise four, or possibly five
provinces in the
South”. The
MOD was instructed to report progress at the next
meeting.
683.
When
Ministers endorsed the assumption that the UK AOR would
comprise
four
provinces coterminous with the southern region of ORHA, they did so
against
the
background of continuing concern about civilian-military
co-ordination,
ORHA’s
capabilities and the implications of both for the achievement of
the UK’s
objectives
in Iraq.
684.
As Chief of
the Defence Staff, it was Adm Boyce’s responsibility to
ensure
that
military advice on the UK AOR was based on robust analysis of the
military’s
ability and
capacity to meet the UK’s likely obligations to provide security
and
maintain
law and order in the South, taking full account of the wider
strategic
implications
and contingent liabilities.
685.
Adm Boyce’s
advice to the AHMGIR on 24 April on the size of the UK
AOR
was given
at a time of considerable uncertainty in UK policy towards ORHA.
It
is not
clear that his advice took account of the possible impact on the
military’s
capacity to
support the UK’s potential obligations in the South should the
UK
decide to
engage more actively in ORHA.
385
Minutes, 24
April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
120