9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
972.
Mr Day
told the Inquiry that the understanding reached with JAM1 did not
in any
way limit
the ability of UK forces to assist with the Charge of the Knights,
and that by
the time
it happened “that aspect of our dialogue with the Sadrists in Basra
had come
973.
Mr Prentice
met Mr Abdullah, Prime Minister Maliki’s Chief of Staff, on 7
April to
discuss the
phone call between Mr Brown and Prime Minister Maliki on 3
April and to
“correct
the prevailing misconceptions about a lack of UK military
assistance in Basra
and
nefarious deals between the UK and JAM”.482
974.
Mr Prentice
expressed his surprise that the tone of the phone call had not
been
positive as
he had discussed the issues with Mr Abdullah shortly
beforehand. During
the course
of the conversation “a number of points had arisen that PM Brown
had found
difficult
to accept”.
975.
Mr Prentice
added that allegations of a conspiracy between the UK and JAM
were
“very
damaging, unfounded and not understood in London”. The UK had been
open with
Gen
Petraeus and Dr Rubaie about its interaction with JAM. UK military
commanders
also
recalled that, two years previously, when they had proposed
operations against
targeted
JAM leaders in Basra (Operation SALAMANCA – see Section 9.5),
Prime
Minister
Maliki’s office had blocked them. In light of that, it was
difficult to accept
accusations
of malign intention and blame for JAM’s residual capacity. The
fundamental
problem was
Iranian assistance.
976.
Mr Abdullah
agreed and acknowledged that the Prime Minister’s Office had
been
kept in the
picture about the UK’s dealings with JAM.
977.
Comments about
lack of UK assistance during the Charge of the Knights were
also
surprising;
Mr Prentice provided Mr Abdullah with a list of
“non-kinetic support provided
to ISF
while Maliki had been present in Basra” and assured him that the UK
“remained
fully
committed to helping in its post-PIC role in Basra”.
978.
Mr Prentice
asked Mr Abdullah to clarify the UK position with Prime
Minister Maliki
before he
and Mr Brown spoke again, in order “to move the relationship
forward” in
advance of
a planned visit to Washington by Mr Brown on 16
April.
979.
Mr Prentice
also called on Dr Rubaie the following day, and explored “how best
to
correct PM
Maliki’s misapprehensions about the UK’s relations with JAM in
Basra and
the support
that MND(SE) had given during the recent
operations”.483
He
emphasised
the
“delicate political atmosphere in the UK over Iraq” and that
important decisions
over Iraq
policy were pending. Perceptions that the UK contribution and role
were
not
appreciated at the top levels of the Iraqi Government were damaging
and could
“undermine
political will to maintain UK engagement”.
481
Public
hearing, 6 January 2010, pages 37-38.
482
Email FCO
[junior official] to Prentice, 9 April 2008, ‘Meeting with Tariq
‘Abdullah (7 April)’.
483
Email FCO
[junior official] to Prentice, 9 April 2008, ‘Call on NSA Rubaie, 9
April’.
363