3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
673.
Mr Blair
spoke to Mr Annan, who wanted to explore the scope for
compromise,
before the
Azores Summit.233
674.
Mr Blair
reiterated his comment that an impasse had been
reached:
“There was
no point in passing a resolution, which was not backed by force
because
Saddam
would just ignore it. France had also rejected the tests Britain
had put
forward
last week. The problem with the latest French proposal was that
after
allowing a
further month of inspections, there would be yet another discussion
and
we would be
back to where we started. Clear tests were needed … but the
French
would not
accept that. It was very difficult to see a way
through.”
675.
Mr Blair
added that: “Saddam would only comply if there was a clear threat
of force.”
676.
Mr Blair
and Mr Annan also discussed the importance of a strong UN role
in
post‑conflict
Iraq, the need for a relationship between the UN and “whoever
was
occupying
Iraq” and a resolution establishing the relationship between the
occupying
force and
occupied Iraq.
677.
At the
Azores Summit it was agreed that unless there was a
fundamental
change in
the next 24 hours, the UN process would end.
678.
In public
the focus was on a “last chance for peace”. The joint
communiqué
contained a
final appeal to Saddam Hussein to comply with his obligations
and
to the
Security Council to back a second resolution containing an
ultimatum.
679.
When President
Bush, Mr Blair, Mr Aznar and Mr Barroso met in the
Azores,
Mr Blair
stated that the meeting:
“… had to
send a message that this was the final appeal to Saddam to comply,
and
to the
Security Council to back a second resolution containing an
ultimatum.”234
680.
They also
discussed:
•
The need to
avoid an alternative resolution which might secure enough
support
to delay
action.
•
The
likelihood that the invasion would be welcomed but the risk that
there would
be communal
violence.
•
The role
the UN should play, including that it would not be able to deal
with
communal
violence. That would need to be “handled rapidly by the
military”.
•
The
importance of pushing the peace process in the Middle
East.
•
The
document on transatlantic security which they would
issue.
233
Letter
[Francis] Campbell to Owen, 16 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Kofi Annan, 16
March’.
234
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 16 March 2013, ‘Iraq: Summit Meeting in the
Azores: 16 March’.
517