The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
resources,
and asked that mobilised Reservists and military police from other
Services
should be
deployed to assist with Op TELIC investigations.69
103.
Lt Gen Palmer
advised ACM Bagnall on 17 October that the Army’s policy
of
investigating
all deaths, while “cautious and prudent”, placed a heavy burden on
RMP/
SIB
resources.70
There was
scope for the Services to consider a common policy on
when it was
necessary for Service Police to investigate an incident, and when a
BOI
or LAIT
investigation would suffice.
104.
Lt Gen Palmer
also advised that, notwithstanding the Army’s policy, the
main
reason for
delays to investigations on Op TELIC was the difficult working
environment
in Iraq
(including the need for force protection for Service Police and a
potentially hostile
population).
The MOD was now deploying “SIB qualified” Reservists to Iraq, but
the
RMP “remain
swamped with the volume of investigative work”.
105.
In early 2004,
ACM Bagnall and Lt Gen Palmer commissioned an internal
study
to identify
improvements that could be made to the MOD’s investigative
processes, and
in
particular the scope for harmonising procedures across the three
Services.71
106.
The study
reported in late March 2004. It concluded that the core BOI
process
ran
“reasonably well” once triggered. The more significant problems
related to how
and when
BOIs were convened, how they linked to other investigations, and
how their
findings
were processed.
107.
The study
highlighted the “considerable delay” to Army BOIs that could be
caused
by a LAIT
investigation and by the Army’s practice of undertaking a full
RMP/SIB
investigation
into all sudden deaths:
“LAIT TOR
[Terms of Reference] define four weeks for issue of report after
return
from
investigation, and HQLAND BOI Standing Orders define another 14
weeks
after issue
of final LAIT and SIB Reports before the BOI first sits. In other
words,
the target
for the BOI to start is some five months after the incident, if
everything
goes to
plan ... five months seems too long for a routine
target.”
108.
The study also
reported that, while existing guidance emphasised that
investigations
and inquiries should be opened and concluded as quickly as
possible,
“the words
and figures do not match, and it has to be said that the Army’s
target
timescale
of some 10 to 11 months after incident [to the conclusion of the
BOI] looks
somewhat
excessive, particularly when only two months of that is the BOI
itself sitting”.
The
majority of that 10‑11 month period was allocated to “waiting for
any successive
comments”
from advisers and senior officers to complete the BOI
report.
69
Minute
Shirreff to VCDS, 24 September 2003, ‘Op TELIC Incidents –
Investigations’.
70
Minute
Palmer to VCDS, 17 October 2003, ‘TELIC Incidents:
Investigations’.
71
Paper MOD,
25 March 2004 [incorrectly dated on original as 24 February 2004],
‘Inquiries/Investigations
into Death
or Serious Injury on Operations: Scope for Improvement and
Tri‑Service Harmonisation –
a Short
Study for VCDS/DCDS(Pers)’.
96