3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
•
Iraq could
have made a greater effort in the period and it was hard to
understand
why some
measures which might achieve results had not been taken
earlier.
•
It was only
after mid-January that Iraq took a number of steps that had
the
potential
to result in the presentation of either proscribed items or of
relevant
evidence.
The report
was discussed in the Security Council on 7 March.
844.
In meetings in
Madrid on 27 and 28 February, Mr Blair and Mr Aznar
discussed
the need
for a second resolution and the positions of other members of the
Security
Council, including:
•
Mr Aznar’s
concerns following his meeting with President Bush that the
US
might be
over-confident.
•
Doubt that
France would actually veto a resolution although it was
attempting
to prevent
nine positive votes.
•
The need
for the US to “win” the Mexican vote given its “history
of
non‑intervention
… strong anti-US nationalism, and [President] Fox’s
lack
of a majority
in Congress”.
•
President
Lagos’ understanding “that military action would go ahead”, his
view
that “it
would be better for it to do so in the UN context”, his wish not to
have the
“decisive
vote”, and the need “to find something to help Mexico and
Chile”.
•
Pressure
from, for example, Brazil for a common Mexican/Chilean
position.
•
The outcome
of the visit to Africa by Baroness Amos, FCO Parliamentary
Under
Secretary
of State.
•
Hopes that
Pakistan could be persuaded to vote in favour of the
resolution.
•
Uncertainty
about President Putin’s position.
•
That it was
“unlikely that the Arab idea of exile for Saddam would
work,
but it was
worth a try”.259
845.
Mr Blair
focused on:
•
the
importance of keeping close to Dr Blix, who “must not be
taken
in by the likely
Iraqi destruction of the Al Samoud missiles”;
•
the UK’s
assessment of Iraq’s concealment of its WMD;
•
the need to
focus on the “1999 left-overs” and interviews;
259
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 28 February 2003, ‘UK/Spanish Summit, Madrid,
27-28 February: Iraq’.
331