14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

• The CJPTF would “provide some capability” at the end of the year and in the

meantime a number of Predators had been assigned to MND(SE). The use

of Italian Predators within the CJPTF was being investigated.

910. Lt Gen Ridgway warned that, despite those initiatives, “this major capability gap”

was likely to prevail until “end 04 with a particular shortfall over the summer months”.

911. In considering solutions, the provision of a new UK UAV system had “been

discounted”. That included options provided by the Watchkeeper contractors and

the loan of a number of Predator systems from the US because:

“Detailed work identified that current MOD policy for airworthiness and safety for

UAV systems would not allow the use of a new system or the use of Predator under

UK regulation in a timely and cost‑effective manner.”

912. Lt Gen Ridgway wrote that the Watchkeeper programme was expected to proceed

to Main Gate later that year, with “an element of capability to be available from 2006”.

913. Mr Hoon’s Private Office replied on 23 June that Mr Hoon had:

“… noted that we currently have no aerial surveillance capability in theatre, and

the steps that are being taken to close this capability gap. He notes, however,

that despite these initiatives the capability gap is likely to continue until the end

of this year.”481

914. On 13 July, Major General Andrew Stewart, GOC MND(SE) from December 2003

to July 2004, wrote in his post‑operation report:

“Dedicated UK airborne ISTAR assets have been a pretty sorry tale with availability

described as fragile at best. For operations of this nature a stand‑off covert airborne

system is critical to success, and something close to 24 hour coverage is demanded.

For the UK only Nimrod MR2 offers a truly covert capability and it has been superb

for endurance over wide land areas. More of this sort are needed.”482

915. Maj Gen Stewart added:

• “Phoenix has given outstanding service long into the heat of the summer but its

overall utility became severely constrained beyond April.”

• “Desert Hawk has been a joke.”

• “Access to US ISTAR capabilities have, as expected, been subject to perceived

far higher priorities outside the Division’s AO [Area of Operations] and have

therefore been unreliable.”

481 Minute PS/Secretary of State [MOD] to PS/CDI, 23 June 2004, ‘ISTAR Provision to Op TELIC –

UK UAV Operations’.

482 Report Stewart, 13 July 2004, ‘Post Operation Report Operation TELIC 3/4 – 28 December 2003 –

13 July 2004’.

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