15.2 |
Conclusions: Civilian personnel
view that
the UK’s ability to influence developments in Iraq was diminished
by their
absence
(see Section 9.8).
39.
Between 2003
and 2009, decisions on civilian deployment were closely linked
to
assessments
of the security threat in Iraq and departments’ interpretation of
their duty of
care to
staff.
40.
Steps taken by
departments to manage the threat to staff included the provision
of:
•
pre-deployment
security training;
•
secure
transport;
•
close
protection teams; and
•
hardened
accommodation.
41.
Protective
security could not eliminate the risk of death or injury. A number
of
LE staff
and UK-based contractors working for the UK Government were killed
in Iraq.
42.
The evidence
available to the Inquiry shows that the Government made
serious
efforts to
mitigate the risk of injury and death. In addition to protective
security measures:
•
The FCO and
DFID carried out frequent reviews of security in Baghdad,
Basra
and other
locations in Iraq.
•
During
2004, the FCO introduced improved structures for managing
security
issues at
its posts in Iraq, with responsibility shared between
named
decision‑makers
in London and Iraq. Those arrangements were kept
under review.
•
When the
threat was assessed to exceed the protection afforded by the
security
measures in
place, officials and, where appropriate, Ministers, took
quick
decisions
to lock down buildings or to withdraw staff
temporarily.
43.
The number of
civilian personnel in Baghdad and Basra fluctuated as Ministers
and
officials
sought to reconcile departments’ duty of care to staff with
operational needs
and the
finite resources available for enhanced security in the face of a
constantly
evolving threat:
•
On 27 May
2004, Mr Stuart Jack, Head of the FCO Iraq Operations Unit
(IOU)
advised Mr
Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary: “we are currently at the limit
of
technical
measures we can apply to protect staff in Iraq”.13
•
On 8
October 2004, officials advised Mr Straw that the FCO was “reaching
the
limits” of
its ability to increase effective protection.14
13
Minute Jack
to PS [FCO], 27 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Civilian Staffing and
Security’.
14
Minute Iraq
Directorate [junior official] to PS [FCO], 8 October 2004, ‘Staff
Security in Iraq’.
417