6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
327.
The MOD also
advised Mr Blair that agreement on the objectives for a
military
campaign
would be needed.
328.
In relation to
targeting, the “line to take” offered to Mr Blair was that the UK
was
“working up
our strategic objectives for a military campaign. We need to relate
this to
the legal
base we establish.” It was: “Very important that UK and US
objectives are
aligned
soon and in advance of commitment to action so that we can come to
a clear
and common
understanding on targeting
issues and
the information
campaign.”
That would
need “careful handling domestically”.
329.
The detailed
advice from the MOD on targeting is set out later in this
Section
as part of
the consideration of planning for the air campaign.
330.
The background
briefing for Mr Blair explained that the current thinking
was
that the
objectives would be published “close to, or at the start of
hostilities”. The
MOD
explained that the military objectives would enable it to “satisfy”
itself “that they
represent[ed]
minimum use of force as required by international law”, and to use
the
CDS
Directive to indicate “what military missions are legitimate,
including … what targets
we can
legitimately attack from the air; and plan Information
Operations”.
331.
A “publicly
agreed set of aligned military objectives”, being prepared by the
Cabinet
Office,
would enable the UK to participate in a “joined up information
operations
campaign”.
332.
Mr Drummond
sent Mr Rycroft a minute setting out a “few OD Sec points, just
in
case they
slip through the briefing” provided by the FCO and
MOD.115
Those
included
the need to
agree joint military campaign objectives for publication “shortly
before any
conflict
starts” and that the UK should offer a draft.
333.
The
development of objectives for the military campaign is addressed
later in
this Section.
334.
A document
entitled ‘Countdown’ set out a checklist of issues for Mr
Blair’s
discussion
with President Bush.
335.
A document
entitled ‘Countdown’ appears in the No.10 files for 30 January
2003.116
The
document comprised six sections, including:
•
“Military
Questions.”
Whether there were sound plans – in the event that
Saddam
Hussein used WMD, attacked Israel, or destroyed oil wells – to
keep
rival
groups and tribes apart; and to avoid civilian
casualties.
115
Minute
Drummond to Rycroft, 28 January 2003, ‘Iraq: US
Visit’.
116
Note [Blair
to Bush], [30 January 2003], ‘Countdown’.
435