The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
article but
after re‑posturing our shift towards mentoring and support will
ensure
they continue
to develop.”72
130.
The third
iteration of the Better Basra Plan was produced on 2 March 2007.
It
looked to
develop capacity and capability across wider SSR components, such
as
the
judiciary and prison service. It repeated the benchmark that the
police would be
brought to
a “good enough” standard to transition to Provincial Iraqi Control
(PIC). It also
announced
that over the next six months, the UK would be deploying military
transition
teams
(MiTTs) within the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army (see Box,
‘MiTTs’, below).
131.
In June, Major
General Jonathan Shaw, GOC MND(SE) from January 2007
to
August
2007, stated that he was not convinced that the ISF was ready for
transition.
That was in
the light of the continuing decline in security. The US and parts
of the Iraqi
Government
had serious concerns over the ability of the ISF in Basra to cope
with the
security
situation.
132.
Concerns
continued to be raised about the security situation in MND(SE)
and
that the
ISF would not be able to maintain security alone. Mr Dominic
Asquith, British
Ambassador
to Iraq, reported in July that Basrawis had expressed the view to
the
visiting
House of Commons Defence Committee that “a British withdrawal
would
‘be followed
by chaos sweeping the province like a hurricane’”.73
133.
On 8 October
2007, Mr Gordon Brown, who had become Prime Minister
in
June,
announced plans for a significant troop drawdown over the next 12
months.
He described
the need for two remaining phases:
“In the
first, the British forces that remain in Iraq will have the
following tasks: training
and
mentoring the Iraqi Army and police force; securing supply routes
and policing
the
Iran‑Iraq border; and the ability to come to the assistance of the
Iraqi Security
Forces when
called upon. Then in the spring of next year – and guided as
always
by the
advice of our military commanders – we plan to move to a second
stage of
overwatch
where the coalition would maintain a more limited re‑intervention
capacity
and where
the main focus will be on training and mentoring.”74
134.
On 9 October,
Lieutenant General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Chief of
Joint
Operations,
briefed the Chiefs of Staff that the plan for the Iraqi 14th
Division75
would
see initial
operating capability by December 2007, with training complete by
June 2008.
72
Letter
Browne to Blair, 24 January 2007, ‘Next Steps on Force Levels in
Iraq’.
73
eGram
30010/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 13 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Visit of House
of Commons Defence
Committee,
8‑11 July’.
74
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 8 October
2007, column 23.
75
The 10th
Division was the Iraqi Army division in MND(SE) which had been
trained by UK personnel.
It was
given an additional brigade in June 2007 to create a new Division:
14th Division, which would
assume
responsibility for Basra while 10th Division would be responsible
for the rest of the South‑East,
across
Muthanna, Dhi Qar and Maysan provinces.
438