3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
297.
Mr Blair
also emphasised the costs to the Iraqi people of
continuing
the policy
of containment.
298.
Mr Blair
was asked several questions on Iraq during Prime Minister’s
Questions
299.
In response to
questions about whether he would support Dr Blix if he
asked
on 14 February
for more time for inspections, Mr Blair said that the UK would
“take full
account of
anything” Dr Blix said, but the issue was about Iraq’s
co-operation and the
time needed
to make a judgement about whether that was happening:
“… the
judgement that has to be made in the end is one by the Security
Council
as to
whether there is full and complete co-operation by Iraq with the
United
Nations inspectors.”
300.
Mr Blair
warned that there was a:
“… danger
that we get sucked back into delays of months then years, with
the
inspectors
playing a game of hide and seek with Saddam and we are unable
then
to shut
down the weapons of mass destruction programme … that everyone
accepts
is a threat
and a danger to the world.”
301.
Asked whether
military action would make peace in the Middle East more
likely
and Britain
less of a target for terrorists, Mr Blair replied that if
Saddam Hussein had
“complied
fully” with resolution 1441, conflict would not be an issue. The
choice was
Saddam’s,
but:
“… if we
fail to implement resolution 1441, and if we lack the determination
and
resolution
to make sure that that mandate is carried, the consequence will be
that
Saddam is
free to develop weapons of mass destruction. Also there will be
an
increasing
risk that the threat of those weapons of mass destruction and the
existing
terrorist
threat will join together. This country will then be less secure
and safe.”
302.
Asked why
people were not persuaded of the threat, Mr Blair replied that
it would
“be
different if there is a second resolution”. People believed that
Saddam Hussein was
“evil” and
that there was “a threat to this country from his accumulated
weapons of mass
destruction”,
but they asked if there was an alternative to war. That alternative
was “full
and
complete co-operation”.
303.
Asked what
new, proven or imminent threat there was to justify war,
Mr Blair said
that had
been identified in resolution 1441 and the preceding 12 years and
that there
were two
ways to deal with it, disarmament or sanctions. If there was a
decision to go
to war, the
morality of that “should weigh heavily on our conscience because
innocent
people die
as well as the guilty in a war”. But the way in which Saddam
Hussein had
82
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 12
February 2003, columns 857-860.
233