13.1 |
Resources
that force
to the required standard of readiness, including essential work to
meet
equipment
shortfalls, would be between £500m and £800m.
•
With six
months’ notice, the UK could deploy a large‑scale force comprising
air
and naval
assets and a land force of 35,000 personnel. The cost of
preparing
that force
would be between £800m and £1.1bn.
•
With nine
months’ notice, the UK could deploy the large‑scale force at less
risk.
The cost of
preparing that force would be between £900m and
£1.2bn.
44.
The costs of
deployment and campaigning were additional to the cost of
preparing
those
forces.
45.
Mr William
Nye, Head of the Treasury Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence
Team,
provided
Mr Brown with “some wider context” on 7 June.41
Mr Nye
advised that there
would be
four elements in the cost of military operations against
Iraq:
•
preparing
for the operation;
•
deployment;
•
the
campaign; and
•
any
follow‑up operation, “e.g. a sustained peacekeeping deployment if
part
of Iraq
was occupied”.
46.
Mr Nye
advised that Mr Hoon’s minute covered only the first of those
elements.
The MOD
estimated the cost of deploying a large‑scale force at £100m, plus
a similar
amount for
bringing it back. Estimating the cost of a campaign was
“impossible” in the
absence of
any concept of operations, but would be “several £100 millions”.
The MOD
had
“understandably” given no thought to costs “after the war”,
but:
“… there
must at least be the possibility of some medium‑term deployment
for
peacekeeping
or occupation. If on the scale of the Balkans, it would cost
several
£100 millions
a year.”
47.
Mr Nye
advised that, while a smaller military contribution would reduce
costs, the
MOD was
“strongly in favour of the more expensive large‑scale land
contribution …
Ostensibly
this is for reasons of strategic influence.” Another way to reduce
costs would
be to
provide a more specialised contribution; for example, a land
component, or an air
component,
but not both. The MOD argued that it was premature to close off any
option
until the
US had a clear concept of operations.
48.
Mr Nye
stated that he assumed Mr Brown would not want to comment on
Mr Hoon’s
minute on
paper, but that he might want to factor those points into his
discussions with
Mr Blair.
41
Minute Nye
to Chancellor, 7 June 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential Costs’.
453