The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
generally
define those terms. The Inquiry uses the term “reconstruction” in
line with the
Government’s
common usage:
•
to include
work to repair and build infrastructure, deliver essential services
and
create
jobs;
•
to include
work to build the capacity of Iraqi institutions and reform
Iraq’s
economic,
legislative and governance structures; and
•
to exclude
SSR.
7.
Mr Jack
Straw, the Foreign Secretary, issued a Written Ministerial
Statement setting
out the
UK’s strategic objectives for Iraq on 7 January
2003.1
The
objectives included
a definition
of the UK’s desired end state for a post-Saddam Iraq:
“We would
like Iraq to become a stable, united and law abiding state,
within
its present
borders, co-operating with the international community, no
longer
posing a
threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by
all its
international
obligations and providing effective and representative government
to
its own
people.”
8.
The
development of the UK’s objectives for post-conflict Iraq is
addressed in detail
in Sections
6.4 and 6.5.
9.
The ‘Vision
for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ issued by Mr Blair, President
Bush and
Mr José
María Aznar, the Prime Minister of Spain, at the Azores Summit on
16 March,
included a
number of specific commitments on post-conflict
reconstruction.2
The
three
leaders
declared:
“We will
work to prevent and repair damage by Saddam Hussein’s regime
to
the natural
resources of Iraq and pledge to protect them as a national asset
of
and for the
Iraqi people. All Iraqis should share the wealth generated by
their
national
economy …
“In
achieving this vision, we plan to work in close partnership with
international
institutions,
including the United Nations … If conflict occurs, we plan to seek
the
adoption,
on an urgent basis, of new United Nations Security Council
resolutions
that would
affirm Iraq’s territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of
humanitarian
relief, and
endorse an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq. We
will also
propose
that the Secretary-General be given authority, on an interim basis,
to ensure
that the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people continue to be met through
the
Oil‑for-Food
program.
1
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 January
2003, column 4WS.
2
Statement
of the Atlantic Summit, 16 March 2003, ‘A Vision for Iraq and the
Iraqi People’.
4