6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
We can try
to persuade David Manning … that this should be our exclusive
military
focus. But
it is the Prime Minister himself whose mind needs to be
changed.
“You have
talked to Suma [Chakrabarti] about the fact that we are still not
getting
access to
all the military planning or intelligence on Iraq. We need to be in
on
David Manning’s
regular COBR meetings; I tried before Christmas and
failed.”
1090.
The Chiefs
of Staff discussed Phase IV on 15 January. Adm Boyce
stated
that the
challenge would be to match the “top-down” work led by the FCO and
the
Cabinet
Office with the “bottom-up” work in PJHQ.
1091.
In view of the
need for an urgent decision on military deployment, the Chiefs
of
Staff
updated Mr Blair on the military plan on 15 January (see Section
6.2).525
Mr
Hoon,
Mr Powell,
Sir David Manning, Sir Kevin Tebbit and others were present. The
FCO and
DFID were
not represented.
1092.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussed Iraq before meeting Mr Blair. The record of
the
discussion
stated:
“CDS [Adm
Boyce] underscored the potential dangers associated with
‘catastrophic
success’
and the implicit need to develop thinking for aftermath management.
In
planning
for Phase IV, the UK was adopting a twin track approach: the FCO
and
Cabinet
Office were leading the top-down strand, and PJHQ was leading the
bottom-
up effort.
The challenge which lay ahead was matching the two pieces of work …
The
UK concept
at the strategic level was to develop a model that could be offered
to the
US. It was
assessed that the US was still working to an unrealistic assumption
that
their
forces would be ‘welcomed with open arms’ by the Iraqi people
during Phase IV
operations,
and there was an opportunity for the UK to lead the aftermath
debate.”526
1093.
Lord Boyce
told the Inquiry that:
“… in
talking to senior people within the Pentagon … there was this
expectation
that … the
Coalition would be seen as liberating the country and that they
would be
hugely
welcomed … It was impossible to persuade the people I spoke to, and
this
was so
further down, to some of my subordinates as well, impossible to
dissuade
the
Americans that this would not be the case.”527
1094.
Mr Johnson
sent advice and a draft letter for No.10 to Mr Hoon’s Private
Office
on 15
January.528
He informed
Mr Hoon that the Chiefs of Staff endorsed the proposed
UK role in
southern Iraq. Mr Hoon was advised that a number of issues needed
to be
resolved
before it could be concluded that the US plan represented a winning
concept,
525
Minute
MA/DCJO to MA/CJO, 15 January 2003, ‘Briefing to Prime
Minister’.
526
Minutes, 15
January 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
527
Public
hearing 27 January 2011, pages 76-77.
528
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK
land contribution’.
297