The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Assessment
should put intelligence into a sensible real-world context and
identify
elements
that can inform policy-making. Evaluation, analysis and assessment
thus
transform
the raw material of intelligence so that it can be assimilated in
the same
way as
other information provided to decision-makers at all levels of
Government.”276
663.
The Cabinet
Office document also states:
“Intelligence
collected by the three [intelligence] Agencies is passed directly
in
the form of
reports to customer departments in Government, where it informs
and
assists
decision-making. It contributes with other sources of information
to threat
assessment
work and other longer-term analysis and assessment.
Intelligence
reporting
from the Agencies is also used to support field operations by the
Armed
Forces and
the law enforcement agencies.”
“You can’t
take good decisions unless you have good information and can
separate
facts from
opinion and speculation.”277
664.
The core
construct that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained chemical
and
biological
warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if
possible
enhance its
capabilities, including at some point in the future a nuclear
capability,
and was
pursuing an active policy of deception and concealment,
underpinned
the UK
Government position that Iraq was a threat that had to be dealt
with and it
needed to
disarm or be disarmed.
665.
That
remained the case up to and beyond the decision to invade Iraq
in
March
2003.
666.
As the Report
of the Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (the
Butler
Report) stated:
“Intelligence
on Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical and nuclear
programmes
was used in
support of the execution of …
[Government] policy on Iraq for three
main
purposes:
•
T
o inform
planning for a military campaign if that
should be necessary, in
particular
in relation to unconventional weapons, for providing the
necessary
safeguards
for coalition troops, diplomatic personnel and others;
and
for targeting.
•
To inform
domestic and international opinion of the UK’s
assessment
of Iraq’s
holdings, programmes and intentions, in support
of the
Government’s
advocacy of its changing policy towards Iraq.
276
Cabinet
Office, 19 November 2010, National
Intelligence Machinery, page
36.
277
Cabinet
Office, 19 November 2010, National
Intelligence Machinery, page
20.
410