The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Should
anything be done differently? At the operational level, I judge
not. We need
to maintain
the momentum of security handover in Iraq, and continue our build
up
in
Afghanistan, but stay alert and agile. At the strategic level,
there are at least two
areas worth
our early attention. In Iraq, and I recognise that this is
essentially a
political
issue, there will be the need to think through the presentational
challenge of
a
post-security handover Iraq – and particularly Basra – that retains
some fairly ugly
aspects. In
Afghanistan, the issue is NATO’s capability …”
715.
ACM Stirrup
also reported the views of UK staff based in Baghdad that
“the
remainder
of 2006 would be both decisive and challenging, with the trajectory
depending
principally
on the new Iraqi Government’s effectiveness”.
716.
On 10 May, Maj
Gen Cooper reported that the Basra Provincial Council
announced
that it was
ending an official boycott of engagement with the Multi-National
Force (MNF),
which had
complicated relations between the MNF and local authorities since
the
Jameat
incident in September 2005.348
717.
The British
Consul General and local Brigade Commander had been invited
to
attend the
Governor’s Provincial Security Committee on 9 May.
718.
On 10 May, the
JIC reviewed the recent trends in violence in Iraq and a
possible
change of
attitude among Sunni insurgents towards the MNF and jihadist
groups.349
719.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements included:
“I.
Violence in Iraq has been rising since the start of the year,
mainly in the Sunni
heartlands
and Baghdad. The sustained violence in April has been
unprecedented,
maintaining
levels only previously seen in spikes associated with the
January
election
and constitutional referendum in October 2005. Increased
sectarian
violence
shows no sign of reducing.”
720.
The JIC
assessed that there had been some change in the nature of the
violence,
with more
Iraqis being killed. Attacks on the Iraqi Security Forces accounted
for around
15 percent
of all attacks and sectarian violence had risen sharply since the
bombing of
the
al-Askari mosque in Samarra in February.
721.
The JIC judged
that the “commitment of Sunni Arab nationalists to a
violent
campaign is
largely undiminished” and that support among the general Sunni
population
for attacks
on the MNF “remains strong”. In addition:
“III. In
many areas co-operation between Sunni Arab nationalist insurgents
and
jihadists
is growing. The distinction between some groups is becoming
increasingly
348
Minute
Cooper, 10 May 2006, ‘Iraq: Update’ attaching ‘GOC MND(SE) –
Southern Iraq Update –
10 May
2006’.
349
JIC
Assessment, 10 May 2006, ‘Iraq: How is the Sunni Insurgency
Evolving?’
606