Executive
Summary
705.
In June 2004,
the US and UK ceased to be Occupying Powers in Iraq and
the
CPA was
disbanded. Responsibility for day‑to‑day interaction on civil
affairs with the
Iraqi
Interim Government on civil affairs passed to the newly appointed
British and
US Ambassadors.
706.
After the
handover, the UK’s priorities were to maintain the momentum of
the
political
process towards elections in January 2005, and to ensure that the
conditions
for the
drawdown of its forces were achieved.
707.
Mr Blair
and President Bush continued to discuss Iraq on a regular
basis.
It continued
to be the case that relatively small issues were raised to this
level.
The UK took
false comfort that it was involved in US decision‑making from the
strength
of that
relationship.
708.
Themes which
Mr Blair emphasised to President Bush included the
acceleration
of Security
Sector Reform and the Iraqiisation of security, UN engagement,
better
outreach to
the Sunni community (often referred to as “reconciliation”),
provision of direct
support to
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and better use of local media to
transmit a positive
message
about the coalition’s intentions and actions.
709.
By July 2004,
the UK envisaged that, providing the necessary criteria
were
met, there
would be a gradual reduction in troop numbers during 2005
leading
to final withdrawal
in 2006, to be followed by a period of “Strategic
Overwatch”.
710.
The most
important of the criteria that would enable coalition troops to
withdraw
was the
ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to take the lead on security
(Iraqiisation).
Having
recognised that a stable and secure environment was the key factor
on which
progress in
Iraq depended, by May 2004 the UK solution was “a better and
quicker
plan for
building Iraqi capacity in the Police, Civil Defence Corps, the
Army and the
Intelligence
Service”.247
This made
sense in the long term but was unlikely to meet
the requirement
to regain control of Iraq rapidly in the face of a mounting
insurgency.
Reform of
the Iraqi Security Forces is addressed in detail in Section
12.
711.
By mid‑August,
the level of attacks against coalition forces had matched
the
previous
peak in April of the same year. In September, Lieutenant General
John McColl
(Senior
British Military Representative – Iraq) judged that the Iraqi
Security Forces would
not be able
to take full responsibility for security before 2006.
247
Letter
Bowen to Baker, 13 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Security’.
97