The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

57. Mr Annan sent the letter to the President of the Security Council, asking him to bring

it to the attention of the Council.16

58. Mr Blair and Mr Straw agreed that they should secure as much of the elements

required as possible in a first resolution, keeping an open mind on whether

to seek two resolutions as the US would not at that stage accept a two stage

approach.

59. Sir David Manning discussed the Iraqi initiative with Dr Rice in the early hours

of 17 September.

60. Sir David reported to Mr Blair that he had told Dr Rice Mr Blair’s position was that

“the UN must be a facilitator for Iraqi disarmament”.17 The UK would “continue to express

scepticism about Saddam’s intentions, given his capacity for games playing”. Sir David

stated he was sure Mr Blair would “continue to insist on a very tough resolution”

demanding the return of inspectors and Iraq’s full and immediate compliance with

its terms. The UK would argue that “the new resolution was as important as ever in

establishing the criteria for future Iraqi behaviour, and the benchmark for measuring it”.

61. Sir David and Dr Rice had agreed to speak again later that day.

62. Mr Blair discussed the “state of play on the Iraq UNSCR(s)[UN Security Council

resolutions]” with Mr Straw and Sir Jeremy Greenstock on 17 September.18 Mr Jonathan

Powell (Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff), Sir David Manning, Mr Alastair Campbell (Mr Blair’s

Director of Communications and Strategy), and Baroness Morgan (Mr Blair’s Director

of Political and Government Relations), were also present.

63. The record of the meeting listed its conclusions as:

• “The UK should continue to press, quickly, for a new resolution

(a) describing Saddam [Hussein] as in ‘material breach’ of his obligations,

(b) setting out the demand … to allow unconditional UNMOVIC entry, and

(c) u sing the strongest language the Security Council … would bear on

the consequences in the event of non‑compliance …”

• The UK should “seek to secure in the first resolution as much as possible of

the wording required, using the argument that the tougher the resolution, the

less likely military action would become”; and “keep an open mind on whether

a second resolution would be required, ruling it neither in nor out. It would

be too much for the US to accept two resolutions now.”

16 UN Security Council, 16 September 2002, ‘Letter dated 16 September from the Secretary‑General

addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/2002/1034).

17 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

18 Letter Rycroft to Sedwill, 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with Foreign Secretary and

Sir Jeremy Greenstock, 17 September’.

210