9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
Ministers
considered the next phase of the UK presence in Iraq because
Mr Jones was
not clear
to what extent Mr Baker had been kept
informed.201
410.
After
describing the process of negotiation and detainee releases, and
the
accompanying
reduction in IDF, Mr Jones concluded: “This is the context of
optimism
within
which the military have drawn up their options for a future posture
in southeastern
Iraq, which
are far more forward-leaning than they would have been before
the
summer break.”
411.
Mr Jones
described maintaining the relationship with JAM1 and keeping “the
plates
spinning in
the complex relationship between JAM/OMS, Badr/ISCI, Fadhila
and
Mohan/the
ISF/the GoI” as “the sine qua non for sustained quiet in the
province”.
412.
Maj Gen Binns
reported to Lt Gen Houghton on 20 September that, after
returning
to Iraq,
Gen Petraeus had guided his staff towards a goal of transition to
PIC in Basra in
413.
Maj Gen Binns
also wrote that information from multiple sources indicated that
the
security
situation in Basra was improving and the Iraqi Police and Army were
conducting
joint
military/police patrols within the city. Basrawis seemed
“reassured” by this, though
they
remained concerned that the militias were using the cease-fire
period to reorganise
and
resupply. Criminality and gangsterism continued to be “endemic”.
Maj Gen Binns
considered
that the security situation was best summed up as “bad, but a lot
better now”.
414.
AM Peach told
the Chiefs of Staff on 20 September that the Iraqi Government
had
“welcomed”
the Gen Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testimony and
that:
“PM Maliki
was reportedly buoyed by the report and had interpreted the lack of
direct
personal
criticism towards him as a sign of international
support.”203
415.
The Chiefs of
Staff observed that the next review of progress in Iraq
commissioned
from Gen
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker in March 2008 “had the potential to
create
a further
strategic pause, which could make longer term UK planning
problematic”.
416.
The MIG met on
22 September.204
According to
an account of the meeting by a
government
official working closely with the military who had attended it, Maj
Gen Binns
wanted to
use the time bought by the next detainee releases “to turn the
[NAME OF
OPERATION]
cease-fire into a genuine peace process”. The key aim was to bind
JAM
into the
process so that it continued when there were no more detainees to
release.
A Basra
political conference outside Iraq or a development conference in
the city itself
were
possible means for doing so.
201
Letter
Jones to Baker, 20 September 2007, ‘Basra: The Mohan
Initiative’.
202
Minute
Binns to CJO, 20 September 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update –
20 September
2007’.
203
Minutes, 20
September 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
204
Email
government official working closely with the military, 24 September
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
Implications for [presence at current location]’.
261