3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
619.
In a separate
telegram, Sir Jeremy Greenstock warned that “the terms of
the
Iraq debate
are not moving in our favour … most Council members are focused
on
giving more
time to inspections not on the Iraqi failure to
disarm”.211
He
highlighted
key areas
for discussion at the Security Council meetings on 27 and 29
January, and
wrote: “If
UNMOVIC can produce the evidence of Iraqi biological or chemical
weapons
in
particular … we have a very good chance of turning Council opinion
back towards
a second
resolution.”
620.
Sir John
Holmes, British Ambassador to France, advised that the
gap
between the
UK and French positions was “unbridgeable”. President Chirac
was
strongly
opposed to war and thought it would have disastrous
consequences.
France also
questioned the level of threat posed by Iraq.
621.
On 21 January,
Sir John Holmes wrote to Sir David Manning setting out
his
perspective
on the French position.212
Sir John
Holmes acknowledged that France would
try “to
avoid having to veto” and noted that “opportunities to push Chirac
in our direction
may arise
as circumstances change”.
622.
Sir John
reported that President Chirac strongly opposed war and that for
him
preventing
it was more important than disarming Saddam Hussein. It would be
very
difficult
to persuade President Chirac to:
“… support
a second resolution and participate in war short of a new and
evident
casus
belli. He may well
accept the pain of exclusion from the action than
change
this
position, though he has yet to face up to this choice and hopes to
avoid it.
The driving
force of Chirac’s policy is to avoid a war at almost any cost. He
does
not believe
it is necessary/proportionate to the real threat. He fears
disastrous
consequences
in the region for the MEPP, for the US‑Western image more
widely,
and for
further fuelling of terrorism …”
623.
Sir John
reported that terrorism was perceived as the most urgent threat
which the
French
thought was in danger of being neglected. President Chirac was also
“seriously
concerned”
about the effect on the world economy and the impact of that on
France’s
economic
recovery. Beyond those concerns, Sir John described President
Chirac as
wanting to
demonstrate a different, multilateralist world view and preserve
French
influence
through keeping the main decisions in the Security Council.
President Chirac
did not
really believe Saddam Hussein was a threat although WMD more widely
were.
624.
Sir John
Holmes described French tactics as to “encourage international
pressure
against the
war, to argue for more time, to help the inspectors do their work,
and
to put more
pressure on Saddam to co‑operate”. Sir John advised that
President
Chirac did
not believe there was anything seriously incriminating to find; a
view which
211
Telegram
122 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 22 January 2003, ‘Iraq: The
Run‑Up to 27 and
29 January’.
212
Letter
Holmes to Manning, 21 January 2003, ‘Iraq: French
Thinking’.
109