The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
on Basra,
probably in mid-2007. The immature ISF is being pushed into the
lead
when it may
not be ready; we are playing for high stakes if it fails. The
Maliki
government
is less than a band of brothers, but it’s what we’ve got and it
deserves
our
support. Violence reached a crescendo in July before decisive US
intervention;
the level
of sectarian ambition may be changing as the Shia are tempted to
think
they can
win. Casey regards the battle for Baghdad as the battle for Iraq
and
identifies
the period to the end of the year as decisive.”
142.
Of the
situation in MND(SE), Lt Gen Fry observed that, PIC in Maysan and
the
reduction
of troop levels in Basra by mid-2007:
“… may mark
the beginning of the most difficult phase of the campaign as we
will
be required
to maintain operational overwatch across a large area, for which we
will
have little
tactical feel, for an unspecified period and against an uncertain
political
backdrop.
At the same time, we will have to deliver a recalcitrant Basra
Province
to PIC with
a limited force confronting, potentially, a series of concurrent
liabilities
within the
extended AOR [Area of Responsibility].”
143.
Lt Gen Fry
considered that a key political priority was for Prime Minister
Maliki to
begin
taking forward legislation to resolve the issues that were set
aside in the drafting
of the
Constitution.
144.
Those issues
were “the most divisive in Iraqi politics and have the capacity
to
bring about
sectarian political confrontation; with that comes the risk of
another round of
inter‑confessional
violence”. There was a “very ambitious timetable” for resolving
them
before a
referendum in the spring due to “an American ambition to test the
capacity of
immature
Iraqi institutions by pushing them aggressively
forward”.
145.
In an addendum
to his main post‑tour report, Lt Gen Fry reported that
“Sunni
engagement
is back on”, something he attributed to the success of the
Baghdad
Security
Plan, and that there were plans to develop “JAM engagement” as part
of the
final
stages of that Plan.101
146.
On 1
September, Mr Browne’s Private Secretary wrote to
Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary
that Mr Browne had approved the additional troops requested
for
Op SALAMANCA
because he had “judged that the likely impact of a short
term
extension
of an increased troop presence is offset by the need for
momentum
for the projects
that will make a visible impact in the city”.102
147.
As Parliament
was not sitting, Mr Browne intended to write to
Opposition
spokesmen
directly with a copy of his statement on the uplift in
numbers.
101
Minute Fry
to PSO/CDS, 3 September 2006, ‘SBMR‑I: Addendum to End of Tour
Report’.
102
Letter
Beadle to Banner, 1 September 2006, ‘Iraq: troop levels in support
of Op. SALAMANCA’.
30