1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
within the
P5 on a package of measures would “require some painful adjustments
for
ourselves
and, even more so, for the Americans”.
70.
The new US
Administration was expected to carry out a full policy
review.
Mr Cook
advised:
“We need to
get in early and be prepared to press them hard. Their first
instincts
will be to
look at tougher measures e.g. tighter sanctions, military action,
greater
emphasis on
regime overthrow. None of these will have any credible support.
Our
pitch
should be to persuade the US of the unattractiveness of these
options and
then
convince them that SCR 1284 best serves our
interests.”
71.
On Mr Blair’s
concerns over the humanitarian situation, Mr Cook
advised:
“With the
‘Oil-for-Food’ programme likely to be worth US$16bn this year,
the
situation
on the ground is starting to improve. This has taken some of the
sting out
of the
anti-sanctions campaign. But no matter how big the ‘Oil-for-Food’
programme
may become,
it is cumbersome and bureaucratic and relies on Iraqi
co-operation.
It will
never be able to redress the deterioration of Iraq’s
infrastructure, the
impoverishment
of the middle classes, and the stifling of normal economic
activity.”
“Containment
through implementation of SCR 1284 remains the best option for
now.
To make
this achievable we will need to convince the US that this best
serves our
objectives
and that we should work to agree an implementation package which
will
unite the
P5. The status quo is unsustainable and other options are
unattractive.”
73.
Mr Ross told
the Inquiry that the “ambiguities” referred to by Mr Cook related
to the
final
operative paragraphs of resolution 1284, which were “very
complicated and … set
out a
really tortuous route of how the inspectors go back
in”.44
74.
Mr Ross
commented that, although the UK was “quite happy with that
rather
tortured
route”, it wanted P5 unity and “if the Russians and French said
they wanted …
clarification,
then we were prepared to have that discussion”.
75.
According to
published US accounts, Iraq was not seen as one of the
highest
priorities
for the incoming Bush Administration.45
76.
As Section 1.1
describes, a number of senior US politicians had been calling
for
tougher
action on Iraq since 1998. Some of those politicians became senior
members
of
President Bush’s team.
44
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, pages 35-36.
45
Woodward
B. Plan of
Attack. Simon
& Schuster UK, 2004; Haass RN. War of
Necessity,
War of Choice:
A Memoir of two Iraqi Wars. Simon &
Schuster, 2009.
205