The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
326.
Writing to Mr
Ricketts, Mr Brenton recorded a US view of the UK as “driven
by
a wish to
be attentive to the concerns of the UN, the French and the
Russians”.201
As a result
he concluded that “we are going to have to be careful as the
Security Council
negotiation
proceeds, not to uselessly expend the huge credit we have built up
with the
US over the
past few months”.
327.
After visiting
Paris and Berlin to discuss the resolution, Mr Ricketts reported
on
9 May a
“desire in both capitals to co-operate and find solutions. Neither
seemed to see
insuperable
difficulties with the draft.”202
328.
Gen Jackson
visited Iraq from 7 to 10 May.203
He
reported:
“The
situation in the UK AOR is dramatically different from that further
north and
in
particular in Baghdad for understandable reasons … The ethnic and
political
environment
in southern Iraq has facilitated our role … These almost
exclusively
Shia
provinces have been persecuted for almost 20 years, driven to
living in
miserable
conditions, repressed by the regime … A security vacuum still
exists …
[in
Baghdad] particularly at night. Looting, revenge killing and
subversive activities
are rife …
Should a bloody and protracted insurgency establish itself in
Baghdad,
then a
ripple effect is likely to occur.”
329.
Gen Jackson
also observed that the Coalition’s ability to “hold onto the
consent
in the
South” would only be possible if Baghdad remained secure and
stable.
He advised
that:
“… we
should at least look at direct UK military involvement in order to
win ‘hearts
and minds’
and create a more secure environment … I do not believe we
can
influence
the situation in Baghdad without engagement. Nor do I believe
that
committal
of HQ ARRC alone will address what is essentially a tactical
problem,
albeit one
with strategic overtones. If we make the decision to become
tactically
engaged in
Baghdad then this may well provide much greater strategic focus for
the
rest of
government to support, more strongly, efforts on reconstruction …
The bottom
line is
that if we choose not to influence Baghdad we must be confident of
the US
ability to
improve [its tactics] before tolerance is lost and insurgency sets
in. If we
choose to
influence it we must be confident of improving the situation and
not being
over-engaged
in both the south and the north.”
330.
Gen Jackson
concluded by observing that:
“We must
not throw away these substantial achievements [those of the UK
forces
in
South-East Iraq] by processes that are failing to deliver, and we
must ensure
a secure
environment throughout the theatre – not least in Baghdad – to
enable
successful
reconstruction.”
201
Letter
Brenton to Ricketts, 9 May 2003, ‘Iraq at the Security
Council’.
202
Letter
Ricketts to Pattison, 9 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Key Points from French and
Germans’.
203
Minute CGS
to CDS, 13 May 2003, ‘CGS Visit to Op. TELIC 7-10 May
2003’.
186