6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
its
neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its
international
obligations
on WMD”.
•
To “engage
the US on the need to set military plans within a realistic
political
strategy”,
which included “identifying the succession to Saddam Hussein
and
creating
the conditions necessary to justify government military action,
which
might
include an ultimatum for the return of UN weapons inspectors to
Iraq.
This should
include a call from the Prime Minister to President Bush
ahead
of the
briefing of US military plans to the President on 4
August.
•
The
establishment of a Cabinet Office‑led ad hoc group of officials to
consider
the
development of an information campaign to be agreed with the
US.
394.
The paper
stated that US military planning for action against Iraq was
“proceeding
apace” but
it lacked a political framework: “In particular, little thought has
been given to
creating
the political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and
how to shape it.”
395.
It seemed
“unlikely” that the UK’s objective could be achieved
while
Saddam Hussein’s
regime remained in power. The US objective was
“unambiguously”
the
“removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime, followed by elimination of
Iraqi WMD”. The
view of UK
officials was that it was by “no means certain” that one would
follow from the
other: even
if regime change was “a necessary condition for controlling Iraq’s
WMD”, it
was
“certainly not a sufficient one”.
396.
The paper
stated that “certain preparations would need to be made and
other
considerations
taken into account”. It contained a series of sections addressing
the
conditions
which would be “necessary for military action and UK participation,
including:
•
“a viable
military plan”; and
•
“a positive
risk/benefit assessment”.
397.
In relation
to military planning, the paper stated:
•
The Chiefs
of Staff were not yet able to assess whether the military
plans
were
“sound”; although a “decision in principle” might be needed
“soon”.
•
Ministers
were invited to “note” the potentially long lead times
for
equipping
UK forces to undertake operations in Iraq, and asked
to
agree that
the MOD could bring forward proposals for procurement
of equipment.
398.
The Chiefs of
Staff had advised that there were a number of questions
which
would need
to be answered before US military plans could be assessed as
“sound”.
Those
included:
•
the realism
of a “Running Start”;
•
the
willingness of Iraqi forces to fight; and
235