The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
343.
Finally, Dr
Reid’s paper considered the UK’s “overall Iraq
strategy”:
“Our
overall approach on Iraq across Government needs more
coherence.
The following
steps would help:
•
A
highlighting of our objectives for the end of 2005 and for the end
of 2006,
along with
any milestones in between.
•
A
definition of what would constitute success (preferably in
measurable
terms) in
the political, military and social/reconstruction
spheres.
•
The
establishment of an ad-hoc communications group chaired by a
Minister
to oversee
our approach.”
•
the MOD
should take the lead on police issues in Iraq as the situation
called for
paramilitary
rather than civilian policing;
•
Mr Blair
should reinforce UK concerns about the need for a consistent
approach
to the
insurgency during his next video conference with President Bush;
and
•
UK concerns
about conditions in Iraqi detention facilities should be followed
up
with Iraqi
authorities.153
345.
Mr Blair
also agreed with Dr Reid’s proposal that an increased focus
on
communications
on Iraq was needed. Ministers agreed that Dr Reid should
convene
meetings on
communications issues.
346.
Mr Straw
told DOP(I) that the next few months would be a crucial period for
Iraq.
Although
the political process was on timetable, this was not the same as on
track.
347.
Mr Blair
said that there were two essential objectives: to ensure good
Sunni
turn‑out at
the elections, and to ensure that any Shia or Iranian backlash
against efforts
to achieve
a more inclusive, centrist government could be dealt
with.
348.
In discussion,
Ministers noted that the Constitution was likely to be agreed
by the
referendum,
although this could not be taken for granted. The UK needed to
have
fall‑backs
ready.
349.
DOP(I) agreed
that the UK should work even more closely with the US to
deliver
a
significant Sunni turn-out at the elections and as centrist a
government as possible,
and that
Mr Straw should update colleagues on progress against the
objectives at
subsequent
DOP(I) meetings.
350.
Mr Straw
wrote to DOP(I) members the following day, advising them that
“despite
its
inevitable deficiencies, the draft Constitution represents a major
achievement”.154
153
Minutes, 12
October 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
154
Letter
Foreign Secretary to DOP(I) Committee Members, 13 October 2005,
‘Iraq: Constitution Paper’.
546