The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Iran’s
malign influence in Iraq is deep-rooted and extends across the
political and
sectarian
spectrum. Their influence is supported by bribery, supply of lethal
aid and
an active
and direct IRGC presence in Iraq. But it is only as effective as
the GoI and
the Iraqi
people allow it to be. And in the end, only the GoI and the Iraqi
people will
be able to
contain Iran’s malign influence in their country … Our best
strategy for
helping the
GoI contain malign Iranian influence remains:
•
to continue
exposing nefarious Iranian activity when we have evidence of
it;
•
to support
the US in thumping Iran’s proxies when they are involved
in
violence;
and in parallel
•
to
encourage US-Iranian-Iraqi dialogue over security in
Iraq.
“We should
also continue to acknowledge the legitimacy of benign Iranian
activity –
particularly
in the South. Senior Iraqis often (rightly) remind us that they
cannot
change the
map. Strong, mutually beneficial Iran-Iraq relations are in
everyone’s
interest.”
1014.
Mr Prentice
anticipated that, having being drawn into Basra by Prime
Minister
Maliki, the
US was likely to want to take the opportunity to address negative
Iranian
activity in
southern Iraq. Ambassador Crocker and Gen Petraeus had set up a
cross-
departmental
team to draw up a strategy on how to combat Iranian
influence.
1015.
On 16 April,
the JIC looked again at the extent and nature of Iranian influence
in
“In pursuit
of its aims for Iraq, Iran backs all of the main Iraqi Shia groups
– both
those in
Nuri Al-Maliki’s government and those in opposition. In relation to
the
West, Iraqi
Shia militias offer Iran a means to exert pressure – albeit with
adverse
consequences
for Shia political unity.
“Iran sees
Al-Maliki as the best available Prime Minister … But Iranian
support for
Al‑Maliki
is not a given …
“Al-Maliki’s
decision to take on the JAM in Basra in March was primarily to
address
internal
Iraqi issues, including local crime and suppressing a rival
political group …”
1016.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner reported on 17 April that Gen Mohan and his
successor,
General
Mohammed, were starting to look north of Basra towards al-Qurnah as
a means
of
addressing the flow of lethal aid.499
If
successful, any operation was likely to drive
the
remaining JAM elements further north into Maysan, specifically
al-Amara, which
was both a
haven for those fleeing south from Sadr City and also the major hub
for the
distribution
of lethal aid from Iran.
498
JIC
Assessment, 16 April 2008, ‘Iraq: the Nature and Extent of Iranian
Influence’.
499
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 17 April 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter –
17 April 2008’.
372