The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Equipment
Programme and because of the finite number of Snatch vehicles and
the
lead times
needed by industry to produce additional vehicles in time for a
deployment to
Afghanistan
in 2006.
303.
Cdre Eberle
stated that there was a potential increase in operational activity
over
the period
2005‑2007 and, in particular in 2006, which correlated with
priorities already
identified:
the importance of light forces in combating international terrorism
and the key
capability
of force protection from asymmetric threats. The “requirement for
protected
mobility
and force protection measures” was “unlikely to diminish”. PPVs had
continued
to prove
their worth, “albeit within strict limitations of physical
protection”.
304.
Looking at the
three variants of PPV required, the paper stated that the
User
Requirement
Document (URD)152
for the
Type A (public order) variant remained “extant”.
The URD for
the Type B (expeditionary) variant was “similar to the Type A” but
also
needed:
•
better
physical protection,153
including
protection against fragmentation and
blast,
which was “essential”, and some degree of protection against mines
which
was “highly
desirable”; and
•
the ability
to be fitted with the most appropriate ECM suite to counter
the
prevailing
threat in a given theatre.
305.
In relation to
deployment in Iraq, the paper stated that the employment of
PPV
Snatch was
“threat driven”, which:
“… meant
that all tasks being conducted in or through specific areas have
required
the use of
PPV Snatch, with these tasks ranging from framework patrolling to
the
escorting
of white fleet vehicles that are unable to provide their own top
cover
protection.”
306.
The paper’s
recommendations included:
•
A minimum
requirement of 1,236 vehicles to cover both Type A and Type
B
PPV
variants should be made available to support all UK operations
worldwide
•
A minimum
requirement of 1,228 ECM suites which “should be able to
counter
the
prevailing threat where PPV are deployed”.
•
The figures
were the minimum and not the totality of the
requirement,
constituting
72 percent of the potential peak requirement.
152 A
specification about what the equipment is expected to do and what
features or capabilities it needs to
fulfil its
role.
153
The precise
level of physical protection specified remains
classified.
154
The detail
about how this figure was broken down according to each operation
was provided in an
attached
annex but the MOD has been unable to provide the Inquiry with a
legible copy and unfortunately
the defined
PPV requirement for Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be
seen.
54