The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
382.
The UOR for
additional Warrior armour was approved and the MOD told the
Inquiry
that that
was fitted to vehicles in September 2005.191
383.
The minutes
from the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 27 July stated:
“Following
the recent attacks in Maysan, procedures have been modified
to
counter the
threat: TF [Taskforce] Maysan were now conducting patrols in
Warrior,
and would
not automatically respond to IED incidents to avoid being caught
in
secondary
explosions. An additional Warrior company and the Telic Reserve
RE
[Royal
Engineer] Search Team (from Cyprus) had been deployed into the
area, with
the latter
able to provide a surge capacity for up to 60 days. The current
cycle of
attacks had
‘fixed’ CF [coalition forces] in the area and, as a result,
progress on SSR
had
stagnated; PJHQ had therefore asked for an urgent review of UK SH
[support
helicopters]
priorities, to see if further assets could be allocated to MND(SE)
…”192
384.
Lt Gen Fry
told the Chiefs of Staff that work on PIR IED
countermeasures
continued,
“but thus far they were only effective at very short
range”:
“The
importance was therefore stressed of countering the threat by all
means
possible,
including TTPs. DCDS(EC) confirmed that appropriate action was
being
taken at
the right tempo, and that the work was joined up with US efforts to
counter
similar
threats elsewhere in Iraq.”
385.
On 30 July,
two British security guards employed by Control Risks Group
were
killed
while travelling in an armoured vehicle in Basra.193
The deaths
were later attributed
386.
AM Torpy’s
report of his visit to Iraq in late July 2005 addressed the PIR EFP
IED
attacks:
“With the
exception of Maysan, incident levels across the AOR [Area
of
Responsibility]
remain low and there are no major issues. In Maysan,
significant
effort is
focused on building up an intelligence picture of the group
suspected of
carrying
out the EFP/PIR attacks … whilst at the same time improving overall
force
protection
measures. The GOC is also keen to gain more visibility of possible
Iranian
infiltration
across the border … and maintain the pace of SSR in
Maysan.”195
191
Paper [MOD]
to the Iraq Inquiry, [undated and untitled], in response to letter
Aldred to Duke‑Evans
25 November
2010.
192
Minutes, 27
July 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
193
Report
Smith, 31 July 2005, ‘UK Chief Police Advisor‑Iraq: Weekly
Report’.
194
Minute DJC
to PS/SofS, 26 August 2005, ‘Iraq: Pre‑detonation of Passive Infra
Red Initiated Roadside
Bombs’.
195
Minute
PSO/CJO to PSO/CDS, 5 August 2005, ‘CJO Visit Report – Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iraq and
Qatar 25‑30
July 05’.
66