The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

266. Mr Cook also wrote that Mr Straw had been “genuinely worried” when they had

discussed possible dates for the debate on Iraq. When asked if Mr Blair understood that

he could not go for military action without a second resolution, Mr Straw had replied:

“Tony is just focused on getting a second resolution. He is not thinking about what

we do if it fails.”

267. Mr Campbell also recorded that Mr Blair had taken a telephone call on 11 March

from Mr Rupert Murdoch “who was pressing on timings, saying how News International

would support us, etc”.89 Mr Campbell and Mr Powell “felt it was prompted by

Washington, and another example of their over-crude diplomacy. Murdoch was pushing

all the Republican buttons, how the longer we waited, the harder it got.”

268. The Government has been unable to find any records in the No.10 files of

conversations between Mr Blair and Mr Rupert Murdoch, Chairman and CEO of News

Corporation, Mr James Murdoch, Director/CEO BSkyB, or Lord Black of Crossharbour

(Chairman of The Daily Telegraph) in early 2003.90

269. When he discussed the options with Mr Straw early on 12 March, Mr Blair

decided that the UK would continue to support the US.

270. Mr Straw agreed.

271. In response to a question about consideration of alternative options on the eve of

conflict, Mr Straw initially told the Inquiry that he had:

“… submitted formal minutes to him [Mr Blair]. This was far too serious to make

suggestions to him. So I thought about this a very great deal. I talked to my officials

and advisers in the Foreign Office and the agencies about this. I prepared a paper

for Mr Blair. I talked to him about it.”91

272. The Inquiry was told by a witness it agreed not to identify that, in a meeting on

12 March, with officials from No.10 present, Mr Straw had advised Mr Blair that he

had “the final opportunity to decide on a different track”.92 Mr Straw had suggested to

Mr Blair that he had a “way out and why don’t you take it”. The witness had been “struck”

by “the speed” and the “absolute insistence” of Mr Blair’s response: “he had got his

arguments all marshalled and all laid out”. The witness did not think there was a risk of

Mr Straw resigning.

89 Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.

90 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry, 13 October 2014, ‘Records of Conversations

between Mr Blair and Mr Rupert Murdoch; and Mr Blair and Mr Conrad Black’.

91 Public hearing, 21 January 2010, page 105.

92 Evidence given to the Inquiry on condition of anonymity.

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