The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

473. Following the discussion, Mr Rycroft commissioned further advice on the

conditions the US would want to impose on inspections.

474. France continued to pursue an explicit Security Council decision on any

measures against Iraq, including military action.

475. France produced revised language in New York on 14 October which proposed

that, in the event of a report from UNMOVIC or the IAEA of any serious failure by Iraq

to comply with its obligations, the Security Council would meet to decide any measure,

including the use of force.165 Sir Jeremy Greenstock judged that was unlikely to be

acceptable to the US.

476. Mr Ricketts advised Mr Straw that the French proposal was the first time that they

had been willing to engage in textual discussion and that should be encouraged.166

477. Mr Ricketts wrote that the US was considering seeking text which would decide

that the Council should meet to assess how to meet its responsibility for international

peace and security; and that Iraq would bear responsibility for the consequences. If

that proved acceptable to the US, Mr Ricketts thought that implied a second Council

decision and would “put us in the position of needing a second resolution: and therefore

potentially at odds with the US at a later stage. But that is implicit in the Greenstock

approach.”

478. No.10 officials discussed the position with Lord Goldsmith on 14 October.

479. The advice prepared for Lord Goldsmith focused on the implications of a

failure to secure a resolution authorising the use of force.

480. It included the possibility of action in “exceptional circumstances” without

a Security Council resolution, if it “was evident to and generally accepted by the

international community as a whole” that Iraq had repudiated the cease‑fire and

military force was the only way to secure compliance.

481. Lord Goldsmith met Sir David Manning and Baroness Morgan to discuss Iraq

on 14 October 2002.167

482. The briefing note prepared for Lord Goldsmith advised him that the “French and

Russians” were “insisting on a two resolution approach” whereas the Americans were

“dead against”. There appeared to be a “stalemate” in the discussions, “with neither the

165 Telegram 1963 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq: French Proposal and Second

Iraqi Letter’.

166 Minute Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq Draft SCR: French Compromise

Proposal’.

167 Minute Adams to Attorney General, 14 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with David Manning, 14 October’.

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