The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

569.  Reflecting further discussions with the US Mission in New York on 17 February,

Sir Jeremy subsequently reported that:

• It was proving difficult to define concrete disarmament tasks with the information

available and which did not go further than the resolutions required.

• It would be better if the benchmarks came from Dr Blix. The “key” would be “that

they forced either Iraq to reveal its lie or the Council to come to a conclusion that

Iraq was failing to co-operate”.

• The US Mission still favoured a simple “serious consequences” resolution with

a vote by a certain date (or abandon the exercise altogether) if Iraq had not

radically changed its approach.156

570.  Sir Jeremy advised that he remained of the view that we should put forward a

resolution sooner rather than later to move the debate on. That could include a list of

benchmarks discussed with Dr Blix, but he could also see the attractions of tabling

a resolution now which simply called for disarmament, leaving Dr Blix or the middle-

ground members of the Council to seek to define concrete actions. That would tie the US

into the process. Delay risked appearing to be on the back foot, “uncertainty about our/

the Council’s intentions, perhaps reducing the likelihood that Iraq will realise the game

is up and surrender its WMD (or ditch Saddam)”.

571.  The telegram also made clear that Sir Jeremy had commented to Ambassador

Negroponte that “perhaps we just did not possess the material to convince others that

we were right to claim it was the end of the road”.

572.  The UK Mission in New York offered suggested elements for a resolution

which reflected discussions with Dr Blix.

573.  The UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York provided a paper overnight on

17/18 February setting out possible elements for a new ultimatum strategy.157 It pointed

out that resolution 1441 had used words like “active” and “unconditional” without defining

them, and referred to a “final opportunity” for “immediate” co-operation without specifying

how long that should take.

574.  Addressing whether co-operation had been immediate, the UK Mission stated:

• “On the whole there has been great promptness of response”, and co-operation

on process had been “without delays or foot dragging”.

• Co-operation on substance could “hardly be said” to have been “active”,

although “a few recent measures” could be, “provided their potential usefulness

is borne out by real results”.

156  Telegram 274 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 February 2003, ‘Personal Iraq: Discussion

with Wolf’.

157  Fax UKMIS New York [junior official] to Ricketts and Chaplin, 17 February 2003, attaching Paper

[unattributed], ‘February resolution 2003’.

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