The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… during
the Falklands [Conflict in 1982] … although it was a much shorter
affair
… for that
period that dominated the work of that group of Ministers. They
delegated
everything
else. That didn’t happen… on Iraq.”
54.
Sir David
Manning recognised that the teams working on Iraq were small
and
heavily
loaded, and that fatigue was a factor, but told the
Inquiry:
“I did not
feel that, at official level, we were unable to manage the decision
making
processes
or to relay the wishes of Ministers to the system or to reflect
[the]
system’s
concerns to Ministers themselves.”31
55.
In December
2003, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
presented
a “Strategy
for the FCO” to Parliament, in which it listed the department’s
“key
contributions”
to government.32
They
included:
•
“co-ordination
and leadership of the UK’s international policies”;
•
“expert
foreign policy advice for Ministers and the Prime Minister, feeding
into
the wider
policy process”; and
•
“rapid
gathering, analysis and targeting of information for the Government
and
others”.
56.
In the period
from 2001 to 2003, prime responsibility within the FCO for
information
on other
countries fell to the relevant regional department. For Iraq, that
was the
Middle East
Department (MED), under the supervision of the Director, Middle
East
and North
Africa.
57.
The FCO
Political Director, later known as the Director General
(Political), is the
senior FCO
official responsible for developing and implementing FCO policy on
the most
significant
bilateral and multilateral foreign policy issues facing the UK, and
for directing
policy
advice to Ministers on those issues.
58.
The Political
Director is a member of the FCO Board and reports to the
PUS.
59.
The FCO
Directorate of Strategy and Innovation (DSI) reports to the PUS
and
the FCO
Board. Its role is to review policy in areas of high priority and
supplement or
challenge
advice from the relevant department within the FCO. DSI was a
significant
contributor
of strategy papers on Iraq in the second half of 2002.
60.
The FCO
Research Analysts provided expert support and background for
the
policy
recommendations made by MED and the Iraq Policy Unit, drawing on
information
gained from
contacts with Iraqi politicians and exiles, academics and
journalists, those
31
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 48-49.
32
Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, UK
International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO, December
2003,
Cm
6052.
276