6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
870.
On the
northern option, Lt Gen Reith advised:
“This could
result in UK long-term leadership of the region during
post-conflict
operations:
a position which the US would appear to favour. It would be
a
challenging
area to control and develop, particularly in preserving regional
stability
between the
Turks, Kurds and Sunnis. Whilst the UK has the necessary
experience
and
capability, the challenges do need to be assessed in line with UK
strategic
guidance
…”
871.
The
post-conflict responsibilities in the South were presented as being
more
manageable:
“A
post-conflict positioning of the UK division in the South could be
attractive. The
range of
problems appears less complex and diverse, the long-term force
structure
requirements
could be reduced and local conditions are likely to be more
conducive
to
development and influence. The Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG) is also
a traditional
area of UK
influence.”
872.
The MOD
advised No.10 that post-conflict considerations needed to
“guide
thinking”
on the conflict phase of operations and that the post-conflict
phase
would be “a
challenge in its own right”.
873.
The MOD
warned: “However successful the conflict phase, a
badly-handled
aftermath
would make our intervention a net failure.”
874.
Mr Watkins
wrote to Sir David Manning on 19 November, reporting the formal
US
request for
UK support.423
The letter
was copied to Mr Straw’s Private Office, Mr Brown’s
Private
Office and Mr Bowen.
875.
Mr Watkins
highlighted the importance of the “aftermath”:
“Our own
work has increasingly convinced us that the aftermath of any
military
action will
be a challenge in its own right. This needs to guide thinking on
the conflict
phase for
all sorts of reasons:
•
However
successful the conflict phase, a badly-handled aftermath would
make
our
intervention a net failure.
•
Day 1 of
conflict will also be Day 1 of the aftermath for some parts of
Iraq.
•
The nature
of the conflict will influence the type of aftermath we find
ourselves
managing:
in particular, Iraqi behaviour will have a big impact on the scale
of the
humanitarian
and reconstruction tasks that might emerge.
•
The forces
we commit to conflict will also have to deal with the initial phase
of
the
aftermath, simply by virtue of being there. And of course their
location in the
conflict
phase will largely determine their post-conflict role
…
423
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 19 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning
after UNSCR 1441’.
259