3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
Spain had
all promised full support. Mr Blair had said that “it was very
important that the
UN had come
to a common view on Iraq and therefore on the threat from WMD”.
It:
“… had been
right to go the UN route; but we must now have the courage to
go
the whole
way. The international community had expressed its will and set out
its
demands. It
must not flinch from enforcing them.”
94.
In the press
conference before the bilateral meeting with Mr Blair,
President Bush
was asked
about his expectations of support from the UK in the event of
“possible
conflict”
in Iraq.29
He
replied:
“My
expectation is that we can do this peacefully if Saddam Hussein
disarms …
If he
chooses not to disarm, we will work with our close friends, the
closest of which
is Great
Britain, and we will disarm him. But our first choice is not to use
the military
option, our
first choice is for Mr Saddam Hussein to disarm and that is
where we will
be devoting
a lot of our energies.”
“We will do
what is necessary both to secure ourselves at home and to make
sure
that the
will of the United Nations is enforced abroad. And I think what you
will
find here
at the NATO Summit is a total and united determination … that
Saddam
Hussein has
to disarm himself … and how that happens is a choice for him.
We
hope and
want it to happen through the United Nations inspectors … But if he
fails
to
co‑operate with them … then he will be disarmed by force, and that
is the clear
will of the
international community …”
96.
In his
bilateral discussion with President Bush, Mr Blair confirmed
that the UK would
support the
US militarily if necessary.30
97.
In response to
a request for his views on the military planning, Mr Blair
said there
was a need
to be ready for military action early in the New Year and as soon
as possible
after it
became clear that there was a material breach. There was a chance
of Saddam
Hussein
co‑operating, but it was “no higher than 20 percent”.
98.
In a
discussion about what co‑operation meant, Mr Blair’s view was
that Iraq’s
duty to
co‑operate extended to the declaration, the inspections and the
interviews.
The inspectors
were “meant to enter Iraq and dismantle all the WMD with
full
co‑operation
with Iraq … [I]t was not a game of cat and mouse.” He thought
that
“Saddam
would miscalculate at some point”. Mr Blair doubted that
Saddam Hussein
would admit
to up to date WMD facilities or technology, but he might admit to
some
residual
WMD.
29
The
National Archives, 21 November 2002, Press
conference: PM Tony Blair and President George
Bush.
30
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 21 November 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with President Bush,
21 November’.
21