The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
As
described in Section 8, by 7 April UK troops had entered the city
of Basra.64
The Chiefs
of Staff were informed on 8 April that the troops clearing the old
city area of
Basra had
been “met by a jubilant population”.65
A report on
the evening of the same day stated that: “The situation in the city
has
stabilised
… although looting will remain a problem until normal policing is
restored.”66
The
overnight report from COBR informed Sir David Manning that Major
General Robin
Brims
(General Officer Commanding 1st (UK) Armoured Division) had
identified a potential
local
leader in Basra “with whom he can do business” and had begun the
process of
establishing
a joint commission.67
Looting was
“not as bad as reported in the media”.
Discussion
of Basra at the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 9 April and at Cabinet on
10 April
is covered
in Section 8.
In his
book Losing
Iraq, Mr
Stephen Pelletière, a former CIA senior political analyst on
Iraq
described
the public response to the arrival of UK troops in Basra as
“surprising” because:
“Instead of
being welcomed joyously, the British practically were ignored.
Indeed they
were forced
to look on helplessly as the
Basrawis indulged in an orgy of looting.”68
Major
General Graham Binns, Commander of the 7 Armoured Brigade until
April 2003,
told the
Inquiry:
“We reached
the conclusion that the best way to stop looting was just to get to
a
point where
there was nothing left to loot … we could either try and stop the
looting,
in which
case we would have to shoot people, or we could try and prevent it
but
knowing
that we weren’t going to prevent it and take a pragmatic view … and
then
when we are
ready we will restock it and guard it. But actually trying to
interpose
ourselves
was difficult.”69
140.
Mr Rycroft
wrote to Mr McDonald on 8 April to report discussions on
post-conflict
141.
Mr Blair had
stressed to President Bush the importance of a “joint strategy for
the
next phase”
and of ensuring “legitimacy at every stage”; keeping the UN
representative
involved
would help to ensure UN endorsement.
142.
Discussions
had also covered a US proposal for a conference to start the
process
of
establishing the IIA. Sir David Manning and Mr Blair argued for
slowing down the
formation
of the IIA to ensure that it was properly
representative.
64
Public
hearing Burridge and Brims, 8 December 2009, page 35.
65
Minutes, 8
April 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
66
Paper
[unattributed], 8 April 2003, ‘Annex to Evening Sitrep, 8 April
2003: Military’.
67
Minute
Gibbons to Manning, 9 April 2003, ‘Iraq: COBR Overnight Sitrep 8/9
April’.
68
Pelletiѐre,
SC. Losing
Iraq. Praeger
Security International, 2007.
69
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, page 11.
70
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 8 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Bush, 7-8 April’.
154