The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
564.
Mr Browne’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Blair’s Private Secretary on
12 February
to say that
the MOD had picked up indications that the Danish Government
was
considering
removing their ground forces from Iraq later that
year.292
Such a
decision
would
“present military and political difficulties” for the UK’s
re‑posturing plans in
MND(SE),
possibly requiring UK forces to replace the withdrawn Danish troops
and
“placing
further unwelcome pressure on our force generation for Iraq and
Afghanistan”.
565.
Mr Browne
had relayed the UK’s concerns to the Danish Defence Minister
earlier
that
week.
566.
On 12
February, Mr Dowse passed Sir Nigel Sheinwald a copy of an
unclassified
presentation
that had been the basis of a media briefing by the US military on
Iranian
activity in
Iraq.293
Mr Dowse
commented:
“The
brief’s key judgement that ‘Iran is a significant contributor to
attacks on coalition
forces’
matches our own assessment … The US brief also highlights
casualties
among Iraqi
security forces and civilians from such attacks. This is factually
correct,
although we
judge the MNF have been the prime target.
“Much of
the brief offers evidence in the form of photos of fragments
recovered from
explosions,
damaged vehicles, seized mortar rounds, man‑portable surface to
air
missiles,
roadside bombs and bomb components including TNT blocks,
telemetry
devices –
much of the material exhibiting Farsi markings – and some
photographic
examples of
similar material of known Iranian origin. We are familiar with
this
material
and agree that it offers compelling evidence that Iraqi extremists
are being
equipped
from Iran …”
567.
Mr Dowse
observed that media reporting had highlighted the US briefers’
assertion
that
support for Iraqi Shia extremists was a policy approved “at the
highest levels” of the
Iranian
government, noting that that was consistent with JIC
Assessments.
568.
At DOP on 14
February, Ministers were asked to agree proposals for
re‑posturing
and
drawdown in Iraq and a request for additional troops for
Afghanistan.294
569.
A paper
produced by the MOD for the discussion said:
“We need to
consider our decisions on Iraq and Afghanistan together and
take
a view on
where limited UK military resource can have most strategic
impact
570.
The paper
stated that the UK could only sustain the enduring
operational
deployment
of eight battlegroups. The “military judgement” was that commitment
of
additional
UK resource in Afghanistan was likely to have more military impact
than
292
Letter and
Note McNeil to Banner, 12 February 2007, ‘Iraq: Future Danish
Contribution to MND(SE)’.
293
Minute
Dowse to Sheinwald, 12 February 2007, ‘Iraq: US Brief on Iranian
Activity’.
294
Minutes, 14
February 2007, DOP meeting.
295
Paper MOD
officials, 13 February 2007, ‘Iraq and Afghanistan: Balancing
Military Effort in 2007’.
106