9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
well” and
the rate of sectarian murders was down. Significant Sunni forces
appeared
to be
emerging in Anbar and elsewhere; that could be a positive
development but
there was a
danger that without effective reconciliation they could turn
against the Iraqi
Government.
873.
On Basra, ACM
Stirrup observed that economic progress would address some
of
the
violence by reducing the number of unemployed young men. Officials
noted that the
Basra
economy was largely based on criminality, but work was in hand to
try to stimulate
investment
and sensible planning for economic development.
874.
Mr Blair
concluded that the UK’s objective should be “early Provincial
elections,
leading to
a political setup in Basra with which we could work, and which
provided a
more
effective link between Basra and Bagdad”. He commissioned papers
from the
FCO on:
•
the state
of politics in Basra, and how best to ensure effective investment
and
development
there;
•
the
political, security and economic situation in those provinces which
had
already
made the transition to Iraqi control; and
•
the
situation in outlying areas of Iraq.
875.
Late on the
evening of 24 May, Sir Nigel Sheinwald spoke to
Mr Hadley.476
Mr Hadley
said that recent discussion of a reduction to 4,500 UK troops in
Basra had
caused
“considerable discomfort” to Gen Petraeus and others. They were
concerned
that it
sent “conflicting signals” to “the Iraqis and international
opinion” and would
demoralise
coalition partners, leading them to reduce their
numbers.
876.
Sir Nigel
explained that the change in troop numbers was part of
the
announcement
made in February, and “it made no sense to delay it further”.
Mr Hadley
asked for
Gen Lamb to “talk this through urgently with General Petraeus in
order to
get a
better understanding on the ground”. He added “the later we could
leave it for
an announcement,
the better”.
877.
Sir Nigel
considered that such an intervention by Mr Hadley was
relatively rare,
and
surmised that the issue may well have been raised at a US
Principals’ meeting.
He asked
Lt Gen Lamb to “go over this again” with Gen Petraeus and report
back:
“We can
then decide what further action to take on the political and
military nets
to get
the necessary level of American buy‑in.”
878.
The day after
the meeting, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary provided his weekly
Iraq
Update.477
The update
characterised the security situation as “difficult at the
moment”.
476
Letter
Sheinwald to Hayes, 24 May 2007, ‘Conversation with US National
Security Adviser, 23 May’.
477
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 25 May 2007, ‘Iraq Update, 25
May’.
163