10.3 | Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and stabilisation policy

14 April that it intended to postpone the deployment of its staff to Iraq, citing the 8 April

FCO travel advice.433

734. Under its contract, Foster Wheeler had committed to deploy 34 staff to Baghdad

by 21 April.434

735. In response, the PMO warned Foster Wheeler that postponement could lead to the

termination of its contract.435

736. Mr David Richmond, the Prime Minister’s Deputy Special Representative on

Iraq, reported on 18 April on the challenges of “designing and executing post-conflict

reconstruction in what effectively remains a conflict zone”.436 He advised that there was:

“Probably less activity on the ground than CPA are prepared to admit, as aid

agencies and contractors withdraw personnel to safer areas pending decisions to

re-engage. Main foreign contractors operating at 50 – 75 percent staffing levels.

Some NGOs well below that.”

737. Mr Richmond concluded that the UK needed to consider the advice it gave to UK

development partners and contractors, and the divergence between UK and US advice.

US contractors appeared to operate “as if their even stricter advice against coming to

Iraq does not exist”. The UK’s travel advice gave the Embassy “no option but to counsel

caution … and to reinforce with [UK contractors] the importance of ensuring robust

security arrangements”. Foster Wheeler encapsulated the dilemma: “risk coming out

or losing out.” Mr Richmond advised that the UK should maintain its current line.

738. The Annotated Agenda for the 22 April meeting of the AHMGIR advised that

security had deteriorated “markedly” over Easter (9 to 12 April) and that the risks to UK

civilian staff in Iraq were high.437 The deployment of civilians had been reviewed and,

as a temporary measure, new deployments to Baghdad had been suspended and staff

unable to operate in the current security environment had been withdrawn.

739. The British Embassy Baghdad informed UKTI on 3 May that, largely because of

deteriorating security, there were “next to no” UK business visitors in Baghdad requiring

UKTI assistance.438

740. In advance of the 6 May meeting of the AHMGIR, Mr O’Brien was advised by a DTI

official that UKTI continued to try to “bridge the differences” between Foster Wheeler and

433 Letter O’Connell to CPA/PMO, 14 April 2004, ‘Oil Sector Program Management Contractor’.

434 Minute Lusty to PS/O’Brien [FCO], 10 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Foster Wheeler: Dealing with the Potential

Fallout’.

435 Letter CPA/PMO to O’Connell, 18 April 2004, ‘Contract No. W914NS-04-C-0007’.

436 Telegram 173 IraqRep to FCO London, 18 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Effects of the Recent Crisis on

Reconstruction’.

437 Annotated Agenda, 21 April 2004, ‘Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

438 Email Allen to Lusty, 3 May 2004, ‘Baghdad Commercial Staffing’.

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