12.2 |
Conclusions: Security Sector Reform
79.
Maj
Gen Houghton stated that over 80,000 police officers were
operational with
approximately
20,000 having received training. An accelerated training programme
was
being put
in place by CPATT.
80.
Mr Blair
tried to inject a new sense of urgency into Iraqiisation. In five
meetings
and
conversations with President Bush in May and June, Mr Blair
raised Iraqiisation,
emphasising
its importance and his hope that Lieutenant General David
Petraeus,
Commanding
General Multi‑National Force – Iraq,44
and Prime
Minister Designate
Dr Ayad
Allawi could agree a joint plan on Iraqiisation for
publication.
81.
On 3 June,
Mr Blair asked to be informed of “any
obstacles or
log jams”45
which
he
might need
to raise with President Bush. He commissioned a round‑up on
Iraqiisation
every two
weeks.
82.
Mr Geoff
Hoon, the Defence Secretary, and General Sir Mike Walker,
Chief of the
Defence
Staff, provided Mr Blair with an update on Iraqiisation two
weeks later. Mr Blair
again asked
to be informed of any issues automatically rather than having to
ask.
83.
On 16 June,
Mr Blair wrote to President Bush that the problem with
Iraqiisation was
“obvious”:
“The numbers in the police are there. But not the quality or
equipment …”46
84.
By the end of
the Coalition’s Occupation in June 2004, Ministers were aware
that
Iraqiisation
was critical to the UK’s withdrawal and that it was the quality,
not quantity,
of officers
in the ISF that was critical. But the US and UK were no closer to
achieving
a coherent
SSR strategy for Iraq. As the CPA was disbanded and responsibility
for
day‑to‑day
interaction with the Iraqi Interim Government on civil affairs
passed to the
newly
appointed British and US Ambassadors, there was no plan to develop
one.
For SSR,
the UK’s overwhelming focus was on the army and police. The need
for a robust
judicial
system had been recognised but was poorly supported.
Prisons
were listed as a “priority one area”47
in April
2003 but by December it was reported
that “not
much work had been done in this area”.
In June
2003, Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, told the AHMGIR that
corruption and
intimidation
had left the Iraqi judicial system in a worse state than expected
and that it
would
require a long‑term commitment from the international community to
rebuild it.
In March
2004, a report from Mr Robert Davies, Chief Police Adviser to
the Ministry
of
Interior, stated that only one out of five Iraqi Correctional
Service facilities was
functioning
in the UK’s Area of Responsibility. Even that facility was in poor
condition
and
overcrowded. In January, the prison held 478 prisoners against a
capacity of 230.
44
The MNF‑I
subsumed OSC in June 2004.
45
Letter
Rycroft to Baker, 3 June 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 3
June’.
46
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 16 June 2004, [untitled] attaching Note Blair
[to Bush], [undated], ‘Note ’.
47
Minutes, 4
December 2003, Security Sector Reform meeting.
429