12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1203.
The details of
negotiating the UK’s continued presence in Iraq following the
expiry
of
resolution 1790 on 31 December 2008 is dealt with in Section 9.7.
Ahead of a visit
to Iraq in
late October, Mr John Hutton, the Defence Secretary from
October 2008, was
advised by
the British Embassy Baghdad:
“The UK’s
wish to develop a broader based bilateral relationship, but with
a
continued
defence element focused on training, fits with [Prime Minister]
Maliki’s
own
professed aims. But he remains deeply suspicious of us and feels
politically
besieged …
The US/coalition are still needed to support, train and mentor
Iraqi
Security
Forces as they take on more responsibility. Failure to deliver a
legal base
for this to
continue beyond the end of 2008 would be
destabilising.”1125
1204.
A key issue
with respect to SSR was the provision of a combat role for UK
forces;
the MOD
judged that to be essential to mentor 14th Division but Prime
Minister Maliki
was
reported to be reluctant to authorise it.1126
1205.
In his end of
tour report, Lt Gen Cooper wrote about the UK’s future
strategic
defence
relationship with Iraq:
“As I
depart I confess to a sense of frustration that we have yet to
confirm the nature,
scale and
resource of our long‑term military relationship with Iraq,
particularly with
the Iraqi
Armed Forces. The Gledhill Report1127
on officer
training reported a year
ago, as I
arrived, yet we have yet to confirm what we are offering. The Iraqi
MOD is
very keen,
desperate almost, to establish links with its former mentoring
nation. Thus
far, we
have promised something but not yet delivered it. I acknowledge the
financial
pressure
which the UK Defence budget faces, but we have an opportunity to
cement
a strategic
relationship with a major regional power which sits astride the
second or
third
largest oil reserves in the world.”1128
1206.
The National
Security, International Relations and Defence Committee
(NSID(OD)
– the
creation of which is described in the Box, ‘Machinery of Government
under
Mr Brown’,
earlier in this Section) met on 9 December 2008, and agreed that
the FCO
should seek
agreement on a new long‑term strategy for Iraq
out‑of‑committee.1129
The
strategy
was circulated on 13 January 2009 and subsequently agreed. One of
the key
elements of
the desired the bilateral relationship was “security”:
1125
eGram
41161/008 Baghdad to FCO London, 16 October 2008, ‘Iraq: Visit by
the Defence Secretary
to Baghdad:
Scenesetter’.
1126
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 14 November
2008, ‘Iraq: Update’.
1127
The MOD has
been unable to provide the Inquiry with a copy of this
report.
1128
Report
Cooper, [undated], ‘End of Tour Report 4 Mar 08 to 3 Mar
09’.
1129
Letter
Hickey to Catsaras, 13 January 2009, ‘Iraq: Strategy’ attaching
Paper ‘Iraq: a Review
of Strategy’.
335