Executive
Summary
323.
Baroness
Manningham‑Buller added that subsequent events showed
the
judgement
that Saddam Hussein did not have the capability to do anything
much
in the UK,
had “turned out to be the right judgement”.153
324.
While it was
reasonable for the Government to be concerned about the fusion
of
proliferation
and terrorism, there was no basis in the JIC Assessments to suggest
that
Iraq itself
represented such a threat.
325.
The UK
Government assessed that Iraq had failed to comply with a series
of
UN
resolutions. Instead of disarming as these resolutions had
demanded, Iraq was
assessed to
have concealed materials from past inspections and to have taken
the
opportunity
of the absence of inspections to revive its WMD
programmes.
326.
In Section 4,
the Inquiry has identified the importance of the ingrained belief
of
the Government
and the intelligence community that Saddam Hussein’s regime
retained
chemical
and biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and
if possible
enhance its
capabilities, including at some point in the future a nuclear
capability, and
was
pursuing an active and successful policy of deception and
concealment.
327.
This construct
remained influential despite the lack of significant finds by
inspectors
in the
period leading up to military action in March 2003, and even after
the Occupation
of
Iraq.
328.
Challenging
Saddam Hussein’s “claim” that he had no weapons of
mass
destruction,
Mr Blair said in his speech on 18 March:
•
“... we are
asked to believe that after seven years of obstruction
and
non‑compliance
... he [Saddam Hussein] voluntarily decided to do what he
had
consistently
refused to do under coercion.”
•
“We are
asked now seriously to accept that in the last few years – contrary
to
all
history, contrary to all intelligence – Saddam decided unilaterally
to destroy
those
weapons. I say that such a claim is palpably absurd.”
•
“... Iraq
continues to deny that it has any weapons of mass destruction,
although
no serious
intelligence service anywhere in the world believes
it.”
•
“What is
perfectly clear is that Saddam is playing the same old games
in
the same
old way. Yes, there are minor concessions, but there has been
no
fundamental
change of heart or mind.”154
329.
At no stage
was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical,
biological
or nuclear
weapons or programmes identified and examined by either the JIC or
the
policy
community.
153
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 9.
154
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18 March
2003, columns 760‑764.
45