3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
likely to
be the relationship between a UN Co-ordinator and the military
authorities.
Sir David
reported that “Washington wanted something that was more or less
the
reverse of
the situation in Afghanistan where Brahimi [Mr Lakhdar
Brahimi, Special
Representative
of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the
UN
Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan, October 2001 to December 2004] was
pre-eminent
and the
military were subordinate”.
482.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed the prospects for a vote in the
House
of Commons
and a Road Map for the Middle East.147
Mr Blair
said that it would have
considerable
impact on political opinion in the UK. Later he commented on its
“totemic
significance”
in the Middle East.
483.
On the UN,
Mr Blair commented that the “haggling over texts in New
York
was
frustrating and muddied the waters. But it was buying the vital
time we needed
this weekend.”
484.
Mr Blair
and President Bush also discussed the possibility of a meeting in
the next
few days.
Mr Blair said that it would be useful if something on
aftermath issues could
emerge from
that meeting “with a UN angle”.
485.
A discussion
on the military timetable was reported separately.148
That
envisaged
the
withdrawal of the resolution on 17 March followed by a speech from
President Bush
which would
give Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to leave within 48 hours.
He (President
Bush) would
call for freedom for the Iraqi people and outline the legal base
for
military action.
486.
There would be
no military action before a vote in the UK Parliament on 18
March.
President
Bush would announce the following day that military action had
begun. The
main air
campaign was planned to begin on 22 March.
487.
In a
conversation after the telephone call between Mr Blair and
President Bush,
Mr Bartlett
advised Mr Campbell that the meeting had been postponed to 16
March, and
they had
agreed on the Azores as the venue.149
“Bush said
they could do the Road Map, give it to the Israelis and
Palestinians once
Abu Mazen
[about to become Palestinian Prime Minister] accepts the
position.
“TB said
that would make a big difference, anything up to fifty votes.
‘It’ll cost me
50,000’,
said Bush. TB said he had seen a group of ‘wobbly MPs’ who were all
clear
the Road
Map would help. TB said it might also help him hang on to a couple
of
147
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq and MEPP: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush,
13
March’.
148
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Timetable’.
149
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
483