8  |  The invasion

686.  There is no indication that Mr Blair or Ministers sought or received further

advice on:

• the geographical extent of the UK AOR;

• the implications of the assumption that the boundaries of AOR should

be coterminous with an ORHA region; or

• the UK’s contingency plan for responding to a less permissive

environment.

687.  The Inquiry has seen no evidence that Ministers took a formal decision on

the geographical extent of the UK AOR before the establishment of Multi-National

Division (South-East) (MND(SE)) on 12 July 2003.

688.  Ministers approved 19 April as “R Day”, when recovery, roulement and

redeployment activity formally commenced.386

689.  On 21 April, Secretary Rumsfeld cancelled the deployment of 50,000 additional

US combat troops scheduled to arrive in Iraq shortly and ordered the withdrawal of the

3rd Infantry Division as soon as 1 (UK) Div arrived.387

690.  Hard Lessons, Mr Stuart Bowen’s account, as US Inspector General for Iraq

Reconstruction, of the US experience of reconstruction between 2002 and 2008,

described the impact:

“Rumsfeld’s decision shocked some commanders on the ground, including CFLCC

Commander Lieutenant General McKiernan, who were counting on the additional

manpower to provide a secure environment for post-conflict stabilization. The

reversal also dumbfounded McKiernan’s CFLCC staff, that had just sat through two

video conferences with senior Pentagon officials who had affirmed the decision to

continue deploying forces. [The Head of ORHA, US Lieutenant General (Retired)

Jay] Garner called Rumsfeld and said, ‘You’ve got to stop this. You can’t pull troops

out. In fact, we probably need more right now.’”

691.  The UK AO was declared “permissive”, first by UK forces on 22 April,388 and a few

days later by the UN Security Co-ordinator.389

692.  On 24 April, PJHQ sought Mr Hoon’s approval of the first substantial withdrawal of

ground troops from Iraq with effect from Sunday 27 April.390 The briefing explained that:

• of the 3,500 troops who would return, about 1,500 personnel were due to

redeploy to Iraq as part of future Phase IV operations;

386  Report Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Operation TELIC Hauldown Report’.

387  Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

388  Briefing [MOD], 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10 Sitrep – As at 0630 on 23 April 2003’.

389  Written evidence to the Select Committee on Defence, 16 March 2004, Further Memorandum from the

Ministry of Defence on post conflict issues, February 2004, HC 57-III.

390  Minute Wallace to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 April 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Realignment of UK Forces’.

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