The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
318.
The Iraqis
realised that some inspections had “been mounted on the basis
of
intelligence,”
and had “increased even further” the measures being taken to
prevent
damaging
material being uncovered by either UNMOVIC or the IAEA. That
included
“ensuring
that WMD material only remains at a particular location for an
absolute
maximum of
24 hours, and contingency plans to ensure that ‘crowds’ will
always
be available
to disrupt an inspection that might prove successful”.
319.
The DIS report
concluded that:
“While
UNMOVIC is gaining in confidence, the inspectors are under
increasing
pressure at
a time when consideration is having to be given to a
possible
evacuation.
Internally, despite the full inspection programme having been
under
way for
only some five weeks, there is already a sense that time is running
out.
“UNMOVIC
and the IAEA are capable of conducting thorough
inspections;
however,
mistakes have resulted in at least two inspections failing to
uncover
concealed material
…
“UNMOVIC
and IAEA remain very receptive to UK intelligence. On
balance,
however, in
the absence of Iraqi cooperation, we assess that the
discovery
of a ‘smoking
gun’ will probably be the result of intelligence information,
skill
on the part
of the inspectors, an Iraqi mistake, and an element of
luck.”
320.
Mr Blair
told Mr John Howard that the inspectors’ reports of 28
February
should be
the final reports to the Security Council.
321.
A
BBC
poll published
on 13 February found that 60 percent of people
questioned
thought
that the UK and US Governments had failed to prove their case that
Iraq had
WMD, and 45
percent said that the UK should play no part in a war on Iraq,
whatever
the UN
decided. Fewer than 10 percent said that they would back a war with
Iraq without
322.
Mr Blair
and Mr Howard discussed Dr Blix’s forthcoming report and
the prospects
for a
second resolution in a breakfast meeting on 13
February.89
323.
Sir David
Manning advised that there would be a need to
challenge
Dr Blix’s
likely assessment that there had been some movement on
process
and
some movement on interviews; and to focus in public “on
the underlying
message
that there was no fundamental change in attitude, and the key
questions
remained unanswered”.
International opinion should not be allowed “to be
distracted
by nuances
about process”.
88
BBC
News, 13
February 2003, Blair puts
‘moral’ case for war.
89
Letter
Lloyd to Owen, 13 February 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Breakfast with
John Howard’.
236